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riddle”); and (2) if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the 
conventional view explains, why do minority shareholders still invest their 
money in controlled corporations? (the “flipside of Gilson’s riddle”).  In 
order to answer these conundrums, Professor Gilson himself proposes a 
potential—but partial—solution namely the product market-based account 
(PMBA).  Against this backdrop, I begin with a critical review of the 
PMBA.  Then, I propose alternative solutions to the PMBA for corporate 
governance conundrums.  As for Gilson’s riddle, I analyze how a 
controlling shareholder can gain both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits 
by having more minority shareholders through equity financing (despite 
deep discount on equity securities).  As for the flipside of Gilson’s riddle, I 
explain why minority shareholders tolerate a controlling shareholder’s 
expropriation, and how they can gain benefits through capital market 
transactions that can compensate for insufficient investor protection.  
Consequently, I show that both a controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholders—as a seller and purchasers in a capital market—accept 
market terms and conditions because their interwoven relationship creates 
symbiosis and a mutual hostage situation.  In such cases, their cooperation 
is compelled and strengthened, and economic development ensues.  That 
relationship explains why some bad-law countries have functional capital 
markets—an anomalous result from the standpoint of the conventional 
view. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Law and finance”1 literature was revolutionized by four distinguished 
economists—La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hereinafter 
“LLSV”)—who explained that the legal origin of a country is statistically 
correlated with the quality of corporate governance and patterns of share 
ownership.2  In particular, LLSV’s series of studies3 show that controlling 
 
 1.  See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (examining the origin 
of legal rules in forty nine countries and determining how the legal origin of those rules 
relates to share ownership). 
 2.  See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal 
Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2120 (2001). 
 3.  See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 285 (2008) (providing 
a summary of research showing the correlation between legal origin and economic 
outcomes, determining implications of this research, and attempting to rebut objections to 
this research); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert 
Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000) (arguing 
that the legal approach provides a better understanding of corporate governance than the 
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shareholder regimes—economies that are dominated by controlling 
shareholders—exist in those jurisdictions where minority shareholders are 
not protected from controlling shareholders’ expropriation of corporate 
assets. 4   This view opens a new and insightful paradigm to analyze 
international corporate governance. 
On the other hand, LLSV’s studies have been criticized because their 
conclusions and methodologies are misleading in some respects. 5   In 
addition, many puzzles remain unsolved by law and finance accounts.  In 
particular, in his Stanford Law Review article,6 Professor Ronald Gilson 
raises a critical point that neither LLSV nor the law and finance literature 
explain:  if laws are too poor to protect public investors in “bad-law 
countries”7 as LLSV explain, then why do public investors continue to 
participate in such unfair capital markets?8  A potential answer to this 
question is that public investors in a country with poor investor protection 
would severely discount the price of shares in response to controlling 
shareholders’ expropriation.  Accordingly, corporations could potentially 
receive less proceeds from public investors in a stock market than the 
 
difference between market-centered and bank-centered financial systems); Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (showing that economies with poorer protection 
for investors have smaller capital markets); La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1 
(explaining the correlation between share ownership and the origin of legal rules in many 
countries). 
 4.  Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:  
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2006); Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). 
 5.  Professor Coffee points out that correlation between strength of capital markets and 
legal protection for public investors does not mean causation.  John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms 
Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2154 (2000).  Criticizing 
LLSV’s direction of causation, Professor Milhaupt suggests that economic structures may 
determine law, which is exactly opposite of the law and finance theory.  Milhaupt, supra 
note 2, at 2122-23.  Professor Gilson claims that LLSV depend on a simplified syllogism 
that is insufficient to explain the entire controlling shareholder regimes.  Ronald J. Gilson, 
Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries:  Anchoring Relational 
Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (2007) [hereinafter Controlling Family Shareholders 
in Developing Countries]. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  The expression of “bad-law countries (or jurisdictions)” has been widely used in 
the literature.  See Gilson, supra note 4 (describing bad-law countries as those with 
“inefficient controlling shareholder systems”); Gilson, supra note 5 (using “developing 
countries” and “emerging market countries” interchangeably to describe “bad-law 
countries”). 
 8.  See Gilson, supra note 5, at 634.  This question is referred to as the “flipside of 
Gilson’s riddle.”  On the other hand, for an explanation of “Gilson’s riddle,” see infra notes 
9-11.  See also infra note 30 (explaining how Gilson’s riddle and the flipside of Gilson’s 
riddle are related). 
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intrinsic value of stocks issued.  In other words, as Professor Gilson 
expresses, equity financing might be too expensive to a corporation in a 
bad-law country.9  Then, a closely related puzzle in a bad-law economy 
(hereinafter, “Gilson’s riddle”10) is “why do companies choose to pay the 
very high price for equity given the bad shareholder protection discount 
and the availability of cheaper alternatives[?]” 11   Or, from another 
perspective, why don’t controlling shareholders expropriate more in order 
to compensate for the expensive equity financing?  And why do some of 
them voluntarily set the limit of “tunneling”12—namely, a controlling 
shareholder’s expropriation from minority shareholders—even though total 
expropriation is not efficiently regulated by the poor legal system in a bad-
law jurisdiction?13 
To solve this series of closely related conundrums in bad-law 
countries, Professor Gilson proposes an insightful hypothesis:  the product 
market-based account (PMBA).14  According to the PMBA, a corporation 
treats its minority shareholders fairly because such fair treatment could 
serve as a signal of credibility and trustworthiness to trading partners in a 
product market.15  In this sense, the corporation’s reputational benefits in a 
product market may justify the additional cost of equity in a capital 
market.16  Put differently, even though having a large number of minority 
shareholders is costly due to expensive equity financing, it is ultimately 
beneficial to a controlling shareholder because minority shareholders 
function as proverbial canaries in the coal mine proving the controlling 
shareholders’ integrity.17  In this way, some argue that Gilson’s riddle—i.e., 
the puzzle as to why a controlling shareholder relies on expensive equity 
financing (and consequently has many minority shareholders from a public 
capital market)—is solved. 
 
 9.  Gilson, supra note 5, at 647. 
 10.  “Gilson’s riddle” was coined by Professor Fox.  Discussion with Merritt Fox, 
Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
 11.  See Gilson, supra note 5, at 647 (explaining why equity capital is an unattractive 
option in jurisdictions with poor shareholder protection) (emphasis added). 
 12.  See generally Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & 
Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000) (defining “tunneling” and 
attempting to answer many questions about tunneling and its effects on the legal treatment 
of minority shareholders).  Tunneling refers to the “transfer of assets and profits out of firms 
for the benefit of those who control them,” occurred especially frequently throughout the 
“emerging markets crisis of 1997-1998.”  Id. at 22.  
 13.  See generally Gilson, supra note 5, at 646-51. 
 14.  See id. (discussing product market influences and the role of minority 
shareholders); infra Part I.C (analyzing controlling shareholder regimes and the PMBA). 
 15.  See Gilson, supra note 5, at 646-51. 
 16.  See id.   
 17.  Id. at 648. 
KANG_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/14  10:18 AM 
848 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
The purpose of this Article is to offer, through a theoretical approach 
(rather than via case study), potential answers to the corporate governance 
puzzles raised by Professor Gilson, which still remained uncharted.  Most 
of all, this Article reviews the PMBA,18 and then challenges its general 
application in controlling shareholder regimes.19  In particular, the PMBA’s 
implicit premise—that a controlling shareholder is concerned about a 
corporation’s additional cost in equity finance—is criticized.20  Instead, I 
argue that the controlling shareholder’s personal cost is the core 
determinant of his decision.  In this sense, the PMBA’s premise does not 
hold well under the “controlling minority structure” (CMS)21 where a 
controlling shareholder owns only a small fraction of the economic interest 
of a corporation (e.g., 5%).  In a CMS case which is not uncommon 
throughout the world, a controlling shareholder would not consider a 
corporation’s costs very seriously, as opposed to the theoretical foundation 
of the PMBA.22 
In addition to criticisms of the PMBA, this Article proposes new 
answers to Gilson’s riddle—why a controlling shareholder in a bad-law 
country needs external equity capital even if newly issued stocks are costly 
to him.23  First, the additional cost of equity finance is not out-of-pocket 
cost but opportunity cost so that a controlling shareholder has tendency to 
be less concerned about it.  Second, a controlling shareholder is able to take 
more private benefits if he has more public shareholders investing in new 
equities issued by his controlled corporation.  Put differently, even if a 
controlling shareholder illicitly takes a small amount from each non-
controlling shareholder, the sum of extractions from a large number of non-
controlling shareholders would be huge.  Third, building a large business 
empire may bring a controlling shareholder more psychological utility (or 
non-pecuniary benefits24 such as leadership, fame, and social influence)25 as 
 
 18.  See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing Gilson’s riddle and the PMBA). 
 19.  See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing a critical review of the PMBA). 
 20.   See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing the validity of the PMBA when a controlling 
shareholder owns small economic interest in a corporation).   
 21.  Despite his minority ownership, a CMS controlling shareholder can exercise 
control over a corporation through various voting leverages.  In terms of ownership, a CMS 
controller is also a minority shareholder.  In this Article, however, “minority shareholders” 
are meant to be non-controlling public shareholders.  For a more explanation of the CMS, 
see generally Bebchuk et al., infra note 39 (discussing the disparity between voting rights 
and cash flow rights of a controlling shareholder in the CMS).   
 22.  See infra Part I.C.3.  Nonetheless, equity finance is still expensive to a CMS 
controlling shareholder, since he is required to spend a fraction of the corporation’s cost 
(e.g., 5%) anyway.  Part II solves this problem. 
 23.  As for answers to Gilson’s riddle, see infra Part II. 
 24.  For an explanation of psychological benefits, see Gilson, supra note 4, at 1663-64. 
 25.  Most of the extant literature on corporate governance has focused on a controlling 
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well as handsome economic benefits.  As for the question of a controlling 
shareholder’s voluntary limit of expropriation,26 it can be explained that if a 
controlling family shareholder rationally pursues a long-term goal of 
maximizing his private benefits, then he ought to be generous and attract 
more minority shareholders.27 
As Alfred Marshall famously said, supply and demand “curves are 
like scissor blades that intersect at equilibrium.”28  Analysis from the 
standpoint of a controlling shareholder would be insufficient because 
transactions in a stock market would not take place unless non-controlling 
shareholders purchased shares from a controlled corporation.  In other 
words, both the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders embrace 
one another by accepting market terms and conditions.  Then another 
corporate governance puzzle (hereinafter, the “flipside of Gilson’s 
riddle”)29 can arise:  “why do minority shareholders purchase any shares at 
all in the absence of an observable ceiling on private benefit extraction?”30  
To answer this question, this Article presents a series of unconventional 
 
shareholder’s pecuniary private benefits (i.e., extraction from minority shareholders such as 
self-dealing).  However, a controlling shareholder seeks to gain non-pecuniary private 
benefits from running a corporation as well.  Then, a model assuming that a controlling 
shareholder maximizes his pecuniary benefits is not precise, even though it explains very 
important features of a controlling shareholder regime.  A more precise model is based on 
the notion that a controlling shareholder maximizes his utility arising from non-pecuniary 
benefits as well as pecuniary benefits.  Put differently, a controlling shareholder’s utility 
function (“U”) can be expressed as [U = U (pecuniary benefits, non-pecuniary benefits)]. 
 26.  This question is related to the question mentioned in supra note 8’s accompanying 
text. 
 27.  As for an analysis of a controlling shareholder’s rationally mild tunneling, see 
generally Sang Yop Kang, “Generous Thieves”: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder 
Arrangements in Bad-Law Jurisdictions, DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014) (explaining 
that a self-interested controlling shareholder may impose a lenient level of expropriation 
from minority shareholders since the total pecuniary benefits from repeated and mild 
expropriations would be greater than pecuniary benefits from one-shot and severe 
expropriation). 
 28.  The Concise Library of Economics:  Alfred Marshall, ECONLIB (2008), available 
at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Marshall.html. 
 29.  While Gilson’s riddle approaches from the perspective of buyers (i.e., public 
investors) in a capital market, the flipside of Gilson’s riddle approaches from the perspective 
of sellers (i.e., corporations or controlling shareholders) in a capital market. 
 30.  Gilson, supra note 5, at 647.  As for answers to the flipside of Gilson’s riddle, see 
infra Part III.  Professor Gilson seems to explain that Gilson’s riddle and the flipside of 
Gilson’s riddle are inherently related (“Cost considerations make equity capital an even less 
attractive source of financing in these jurisdictions than in those with good shareholder 
protection.  Indeed, it is a two-sided puzzle, with the possibility of a lemons’ market:  why 
do companies choose to pay the very high price for equity given the bad shareholder 
protection discount and the availability of cheaper alternatives, and why do minority 
shareholders purchase any shares at all in the absence of an observable ceiling on private 
benefit extraction?”  Id.). 
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explanations:  (1) the “stationary controller”31 account; (2) the “limited 
opportunities of other investments” account; (3) the minorities’ behavioral 
finance account; (4) the “minorities might not be damaged” account; (5) the 
foreign minorities account; and (6) the minorities’ free-ride account.  Most 
well-functioning capital markets in less developed economies are likely to 
be subject to at least some of these accounts. 
Against this backdrop, this Article proceeds according to the 
following structure.  Part I sets out the features of controlling shareholder 
regimes and explains how information asymmetry, coupled with 
insufficient protection of public investors, would potentially destroy a 
capital market.  Then, the PMBA is introduced and critically reviewed.  
Part II proposes alternatives to the PMBA, answering Gilson’s riddle from 
the controlling shareholder’s perspective.  Subsequently, Part III proposes 
possible reasons why minority shareholders are willing to participate in a 
seemingly unfair capital market (i.e., the flipside of Gilson’s riddle).  The 
Article then concludes by summarizing key points. 
As the saying goes, “[i]t takes two to tango.”32  A message in this 
Article is that when both a controlling shareholder and minority 
shareholders realize that their interwoven relationship creates symbiosis 
and mutual hostage, their cooperation is often compelled and strengthened.  
Then, economic development could ensue even in a bad-law country.  
Although the combination of well-written laws and efficient enforcement 
mechanisms plays an important role in the development of a capital market, 
a functional market still may form and develop without sufficient formal 
legal protections for public investors.33 
I. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER REGIMES AND THE PRODUCT MARKET-
BASED ACCOUNT 
Berle and Means’ model34 of dispersed ownership assumes that a large 
number of dispersed shareholders collectively own shares of a large-scale 
 
31.  For a further discussion of minority shareholders’ response under a stationary 
controller, see infra Part III.A.   
 32.  Discussion with Merritt Fox, Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
 33.  However, if the present conditions change in the future, it is possible that the 
symbiotic relationship between a controller and non-controlling shareholders would no 
longer exist.  For example, as the process of globalization continues to gain momentum, 
non-controlling shareholders have more opportunities and options to diversify their assets 
internationally.  As a result, a domestic controlling shareholder’s ability to keep public 
investors in his controlled corporation could be diminished.  Discussion with Jeffrey 
Gordon, Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
 34.  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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corporation.35  Since there is no dominant shareholder, corporate power 
belongs to management.  However, this model is limited to the United 
States and the United Kingdom.36  In many countries, controlling family 
shareholders run conglomerates and business groups.37  In developing 
countries with a controlling shareholder regime, minority shareholders are 
poorly protected within formal legal structures, such as corporate and 
securities laws and judicial systems. 
A. Controlling Shareholder Ownership:  The Controlled Structure 
and the Controlling Minority Structure 
In the controlling shareholder regime, most corporate governance 
literature presumes that a large block-holder controls a corporation by 
owning a majority of shares.38  For example, when a dominant shareholder 
owns 51% of a corporation’s shares, he exercises 51% of the voting rights.  
In this way, voting rights and cash flow rights are generally aligned.39  This 
type of controlling shareholder ownership is referred to as a “controlled 
structure” (CS). 40  However, another significant pattern of controlling 
shareholder ownership occurs where a controlling shareholder wields a 
significant percentage of voting rights even though he holds a small 
percentage of equity.  For example, a shareholder who owns 10% of shares 
may be able to exercise 51% of votes in a corporation via voting leverage 
mechanisms.  Since a controlling shareholder is also a minority shareholder 
in terms of the quantity of his equity stake, this regime is referred to as the 
 
 35.  John C. Coffee Jr., The Future as History:  The Prospects for Global Convergence 
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 641 (1999). 
 36.  Id.; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 133 (1999) (explaining how 
most public companies in the United States and the United Kingdom have dispersed 
ownership, while public companies in the rest of the world generally have controlling 
ownership); La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 474 (authors find that “the Berle and Means 
corporation is far from universal, and is quite rare for some definitions of control.”). 
 37.  See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 481-83. 
 38.  See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limit, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 238 (2002) 
(discussing how blockholders who have controlling stock attempt to maintain control by 
owning 51% or more of stock). 
 39.  For a further explanation of the relationship between a controlling shareholder’s 
voting rights and cash flow rights, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, & 
George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity:  The 
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, (Nat’l Bureau 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6951, 1999) (also published in CONCENTRATED CORP. 
OWNERSHIP (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000)), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6951.pdf?new_window=1. 
 40.  Id. at 1. 
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“controlling minority structure” (CMS).41  Many Chinese companies use 
the CMS where a pyramiding structure is used.42  Similar examples of CMS 
are observable in Europe, South America, South Africa, and other Asian 
countries. 
Korean CMS cases are noteworthy.  Controlling family shareholders 
of large corporate groups in Korea hold, on average, 5.04% of ownership 
stake.43  In fact, 5.04% includes family members’ economic interest as well 
as controlling shareholders’ personal economic interest.44  The controlling 
shareholders’ average personal economic interest alone is merely 2.62%.45  
For example, in Samsung Group (Apple’s global business rival, Samsung 
Electronics, is an affiliated firm of the group), Chairman Kun-Hee Lee 
holds only 0.69% of the economic interest,46 although he is undoubtedly 
“the” group’s controlling shareholder with nearly a majority of voting 
rights in the group.  More strikingly, the ownership stake that Chairman 
Tae-Won Choi personally holds in SK Group47 is only 0.04% (note that 
0.04% is not a typo).48  Nonetheless, he effectively wields controlling 
voting power over the entire group. 
How can CMS controlling shareholders maintain control with a small 
fraction of personal (or family) ownership stake?  Professors Bebchuk, 
Kraakman and Triantis explain that “[s]uch a radical separation of control 
 
 41.  Id.; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global 
Governance Standards, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1263, 1313 n.161 (2009) (“The term ‘controlling 
minority’ was introduced by Bebchuk et al. . . . .”). 
 42.  For a general explanation of China’s corporate pyramiding structure, see Joseph 
P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in China, 
CHINESE UNIV. HONG KONG (May 2005), http://www.rieti.go.jp/users/peng-
xu/project/asia/pdf/fan_wong_zhang.pdf. 
 43. See Press Release,  Kor. Exch., Changing Status of Largest Shareholders’ 
Ownership of Stock in Ten Conglomerates of S. Kor. (June 23, 2011) (data was collected as 
of 2011), available 
at  http://www.krx.co.kr/m10/m10_1/m10_1_3/JHPKOR10001_03_01.jsp?sch=all&noti_no
=20249&cur_page=1&rn=6536&word. 
 44.  As of April 2011, among ten of the largest corporate groups in Korea, while 
controlling shareholders individually held 2.42% of economic interest of corporate groups, 
their families hold 2.62% (thus, the total ownership is 5.04 %).  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Jong-Sun Yun,  Kun-Hee Lee 0.69%, Tae-Won Choi 0.04% ‘Dominate Whole 
Enterprise’ by Holding Minimal Economic Interests, E-DAILY NEWS (May 30, 
2013), http://www.edaily.co.kr/news/NewsRead.edy?SCD=JA11&newsid=0197456660281
4168&DCD=A00101&OutLnkChk=Y.  Including his family’s cash flow rights, Mr. Lee 
holds 1.27% of economic interest in Samsung Group.  Id.  
 47.  See Global 500—Our Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Corporations, CNN 
MONEY (July 23, 2012), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/full_list/index.html (ranking SK 
Holdings as sixty-fifth in the world). 
 48.  Yun, supra note 46. 
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and cash flow rights can occur in three principal ways:  through dual-class 
share structures, stock pyramids, and cross-ownership ties.”49 
First, in a dual-class share structure, a corporation issues “two or more 
classes of stock with differential voting rights.”50  For example, Class A 
stock has one-share-one-vote, while Class B stock equates to one-share-
ten-vote.  Some U.S. corporations use such a system.  Second, stock 
pyramiding “is defined as the ultimate ownership of a firm running through 
a chain of ownership of intermediate corporations.”51  In a simple model, an 
individual holds 51% of ownership of Company A, which subsequently 
owns 51% of Company B.  The individual exercises full control over 
Company B through the chain of ownership from Company A even though 
his economic interest in Company B is merely 26% (i.e., 51% x 51% = 
26%).  Third, cross ownership is used when a corporation holds an 
ownership stake in other affiliated firms.  Suppose that there are three 
corporations (Company A, B, and C) in a business group:  Company A 
holds ownership stake of Company B and C; Company B holds ownership 
of Company C and A; and Company C holds ownership of Company A and 
B.  Cross ownership is especially useful in jurisdictions where a dual-class 
share structure and stock pyramiding are not allowed.  Cross ownership 
becomes more complicated as the number of affiliated firms grows within a 
business group.52  Via a network effect that runs through the complicated 
ownership web among affiliated firms, a CMS controller—such as 
Chairman Lee in Samsung and Chairman Choi in SK—can exercise control 
with a small fraction of economic interest. 
In sum, holding a majority of common shares and economic interest is 
not necessary to exercise control.  Rather, one’s “control” means a status 
with a significant holding of “voting” rights.  Indeed, it is often possible 
that a shareholder with less than a majority of the voting rights can wield 
effective control.53  For example, a shareholder may dominate a corporation 
 
 49.  Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 1. 
 50.  Id. at 4. 
 51.  Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang, 
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders, 57 J. FIN., 
2741, 2743 n.1 (2002).  For more explanation on stock pyramiding, see, e.g., Randall Morck 
& Bernard Yeung, Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups, 27 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 367 (2003). 
 52.  If there are “n” affiliated firms in a corporate group, then there are “n x (n – 1)” 
ways for intra-shareholding (through cross ownership in a matrix form) to occur among 
affiliated firms.  For example, if there are 70 affiliated firms (which is not uncommon in 
Korean corporate groups), there are 4,830 possible intra-shareholdings among affiliated 
firms in a corporate group (70 x 69 = 4,830).  If direct cross-shareholding (Company A 
owns a part of Company B, and Company B owns a part of Company A) is prohibited, the 
number of possible ways of intra-shareholding in a corporate group is “n x (n – 1) / 2”. 
 53.  According to the City Code in the United Kingdom, a person (or a group) has 
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with just 40% voting power if the rest of shareholders are dispersed and 
cannot form a unified insurgent group against him.  For the purpose of 
simplicity, however, Table 1 summarizes the two aforementioned patterns 
of controlling shareholder systems, assuming that control means holding 
more than a majority of the voting rights. 
 
TABLE 1:  COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CS AND THE CMS 
 
 CS CMS 
A Controlling 
Shareholder’s  
Cash Flow Rights (“α”) 
More than 50% 
(0.5 < α ≤ 1) 
Less than 50 % 
(0 ≤ α < 0.5) 
A Controlling 
Shareholder’s 
Voting Rights 
More than 50% More than 50 % 
Voting Leverage  
Mechanisms 
None (for the Pure CS) 
-  Stock Pyramiding 
-  Dual-Class Share 
Structure 
-  Cross-Shareholding 
 
B. Asymmetric Information and the Lemon Market Problem 
A well-performing securities market should be built upon disclosed 
information54 and efficient regulations.  In a bad-law country, however, 
investors suffer from insufficient disclosure systems and lack of 
transparency, not to mention inefficient legal infrastructure.  A securities 
market then becomes highly vulnerable to the “lemon” market problem55 
due to the asymmetry of information between sellers (i.e., corporations or 
corporate insiders) and buyers (i.e., investors).  In a corporation where a 
 
control as long as the person (or the group) has more than 30% of voting rights.  The 
Takeover Code, TAKEOVER PANEL, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/the-
code/download-code (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).  See also Sang Yop Kang, Transplanting a 
Poison Pill to Controlling Shareholder Regimes—Why It Is So Difficult, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. 
& BUS. 619, 642 (2013) (explaining that a shareholder can control a corporation without a 
majority of voting rights). 
 54.  For more explanation of the mandatory disclosure and its related discussion, see 
generally Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure:  Why Issuer Choice Is 
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (arguing that the U.S. “should 
reject an issuer choice regime and retain the current [federal] mandatory system”). 
 55.  As for lemon market problem, see generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
“Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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controlling shareholder may be actively involved in transactions tainted 
with conflicts of interest, the controlling shareholder knows that the 
fundamental value of the company has been damaged due to tunneling.  
Conversely, prospective investors in the securities market do not know 
whether the firm is involved in such misconduct and, if so, to what degree.  
At best, investors may only have market statistics about the average quality 
of issuers’ corporate governance.56 
Knowing that corporations are not distinguished in the market based 
on the quality of their corporate governance, issuers with good quality (i.e., 
companies not associated with tunneling) have no incentive to issue, and 
only issuers with bad quality (i.e., companies associated with an enormous 
amount of tunneling) participate in the securities market. 57   Due to 
asymmetric information, therefore, an adverse selection problem emerges.58  
Unfortunately this is not the end of the story.  In turn, because investors 
only know the average quality of companies, they uniformly discount the 
issuance of securities more deeply based on the statistics.59  Then, even 
those relatively well-governed companies would feel pressure to leave the 
market because the price determined by the application of the deeper 
discount to all issuers is too cheap for them and well below the fair value of 
their securities.60  Ultimately, only companies with the worst quality (i.e., 
companies associated with the most egregious forms of expropriation) 
remain in the market in the self-enforcing process of Gresham’s law61—the 
bad drive out the good, the worse drive out the bad, and the worst drive out 
the worse from the market.  Accordingly, the adverse selection is 
 
 56.  See generally id. (discussing the response of market participants under the 
asymmetric information). 
 57.  See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets, 
55 BUS. LAW. 1565, 1567-68 (2000) (explaining that investors discount all corporations’ 
shares in a market, resulting in punishment for corporations where insiders do not siphon 
corporate assets). 
 58.  Adverse selection is a form of market failure.   
Adverse selection arises when products of different qualities are sold at a single 
price because buyers or sellers are not sufficiently informed to determine the 
true quality at the time of purchase.  As a result, too much of the low-quality 
product and too little of the high-quality product are sold in the marketplace. 
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 616 (Pearson Prentice Hall 
6th ed. 2004).  For a further explanation of adverse selection, see RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, 
ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 299-315. 
 59.  See Black, supra note 57, at 1567. 
 60.  See id. at 1568.  See also Akerlof, supra note 55, at 489-92 (introducing the lemon 
problem in the market for used cars). 
61.  Gresham’s law says that “bad money tends to drive good money out of circulation.”  
Richard Dutu, Ed Nosal & Guillaume Rocheteau, The Tale of Gresham’s Law, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland (2005), 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2005/1001.pdf.    
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reinforced, leading to market failure and the possibility of the securities 
market collapsing, in the absence of adequate measures to correct this 
vicious circle.62  Consequently, in a country with poor investor protections, 
in theory we will not be able to observe a significant number of minority 
shareholders and a well-developed securities market. 
This undesirable situation in a bad-law securities market would also 
be expected under the pecking order theory 63  of corporate finance. 64  
According to the theory, given asymmetric information between corporate 
insiders and prospective investors, corporations have a routine order of 
financing:  (1) first, they use internal financing when available; and (2) if 
external financing is required, corporations choose debt over equity.65  As 
Professor Gilson explains, this phenomenon takes place because the cost of 
equity for a corporation is highest among its financing sources. 66  
Prospective investors are more reluctant to purchase newly issued shares 
since they lack sufficient information about a corporation’s share price.  
Under this asymmetric information scheme, prospective investors—if they 
decide to purchase new shares—require a discount.  Accordingly, a 
corporation receives less than the fair amount of proceeds from selling its 
new shares to a capital market.  Consequently, equity financing is costly to 
a corporation, and thus it is unwilling to issue new shares, as long as it is 
able to rely on other types of financing.  Simply put, equity financing is 
known as the last-resort financing.67 
The pecking order of finance could have more serious implications in 
a bad-law jurisdiction for two reasons:  (1) the severe problem of a 
controlling shareholder’s expropriation from minority shareholders makes 
 
 62.  Professors Khanna and Palepu explain that “[i]n extreme cases, the market breaks 
down and no transactions occur.”  Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, The Right Way to 
Restructure Conglomerates in Emerging Markets, 77 HARV. BUS. REV. 125, 130 (1999). 
 63.  For more information on the pecking order theory, see Stewart C. Myers & 
Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have 
Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984). 
 64.  In addition to the pecking order theory, the trade-off theory is an alternative model 
to explain corporations’ finance decisions.  Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, 
Financing Decisions:  Who Issues Stock?, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 549, 549-50 (2005).  According 
to the trade-off theory, debt financing has trade-off effect—while it has tax benefits, it 
increases financial distress.  Id.  
 65.  See generally Myers & Majluf, supra note 63; see also RICHARD A. BREALEY, 
STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 490-94 
(McGraw-Hill 8th ed. 2006).  The pecking order theory relies on an assumption that 
corporate insiders are not willing to issue new shares at an undervalued price in a stock 
market because it will dilute the share price.  Id. at 490-92.  Although the validity of the 
assumption in relation to agency problems is important, it is beyond the scope of this Article.  
Further research will be conducted in an independent project.   
 66.  Gilson, supra note 5 at 647. 
 67.  BREALEY ET AL., supra note 65, at 490. 
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equity investment by public shareholders riskier; and, (2) since the 
jurisdiction has an underdeveloped disclosure system, the information 
asymmetry problem becomes exacerbated.  Consequently, equity’s status 
as the last resort of financing is reinforced,68 and equity financing is 
substantially more costly to a corporation than bank financing in a bad-law 
jurisdiction.69 
C. The Product Market-Based Account 
This Subpart first introduces the product market-based account 
(PMBA),70 and then criticizes various aspects of the PMBA.  In particular, 
this Subpart explains how the PMBA’s explanatory power can be 
weakened when a controlling shareholder has only a small economic 
interest in a corporation. 
1. Gilson’s Riddle and the Product Market-Based Account 
In theory, the cost of equity is so much higher for corporations in bad-
law countries.  Then, as Gilson’s riddle suggests, why in reality are 
corporations in those countries willing to raise capital through an equity 
market (although the frequency is low) and have a significant number of 
public minority shareholders?71  To answer his riddle, Professor Gilson 
himself proposes an insightful hypothesis—the PMBA.  Gilson’s riddle 
presents a conundrum that arises between a controlling shareholder and 
public shareholders.  Accordingly, it seems natural to explore the puzzle 
from the perspective of a capital market where two parties engage in 
transactions.  With the paradigm-shifting analysis, however, the PMBA 
approaches the puzzle from a product market perspective.72 
In a product market, a corporation enters into a myriad of transactions 
and contractual relations with its trading partners.  Bad-law jurisdictions 
lack an efficient commercial law system to enforce contractual obligations 
in product markets.73  Interestingly, such contracts are, nonetheless, often 
honored.  Professor Gilson primarily attributes this phenomenon to the role 
of reputation in a market since reputation works as a sort of self-
enforcement mechanism.74  If a corporation cheats its trading partners 
 
 68.  See Gilson, supra note 5, at 647. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See generally id. at 646-651 (discussing the PMBA). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 635. 
 74.  See id. at 635-36. 
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“today,” an inefficient legal system is unable to punish the corporation.  
However, the corporation will be punished “tomorrow” by market 
mechanisms since market participants will refuse to make transactions with 
such a dishonest corporation. 
Here, Professor Gilson puts forward a brilliant explanation that 
logically connects across a product market as well as a capital market.  
According to the PMBA, if a controlling shareholder treats minority 
shareholders fairly in his controlled corporation, he will be deemed as 
trustworthy by trading partners within a product market.75  In this way, 
minority shareholders are akin to “reputational canaries” who convey a 
signal to trading partners about a controlling shareholder’s integrity.76 
One may ask whether such a signal is merely “cheap talk.”  When a 
controlling shareholder treats minority shareholders fairly, however, it 
means that he is required to give up at least some private benefits that he 
could have otherwise extracted from the corporation.77  In this sense, 
according to the PMBA, the signal—i.e., fair treatment of minority 
shareholders—is costly to a controlling shareholder so that it is credible.78  
In addition, the logic suggests that “[i]f the family-controlled corporation 
does not cheat in easy ways (given poor shareholder protection) by 
exploiting minority shareholders, . . . the controlling family shareholder 
also will not cheat its customers.”79   With a good reputation among 
minority shareholders in a capital market, the corporation over which the 
truly honest controlling shareholder exercises control would have more 
economic opportunities with trading partners in a product market.80 
In sum, the PMBA posits, “[t]he [controlling shareholder’s] decision 
to have minority shareholders then can be explained not by the need for 
capital . . . , but as a way of developing reputation that will be valuable in 
the product market . . . .”81  Such reputational advantage from the product 
market where a controlling shareholder participates in a repeated game82 
may justify the more expensive equity financing in a capital market, thus it 
is argued that Gilson’s riddle is solved. 
 
 75.  Id. at 648. 
 76.  “[M]inority shareholders play the role of reputational canaries, whose value is that 
they help credibly convey to potential traders that the corporation is an honest trading 
partner.”  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  See generally id. at 646-651. 
 81.  Id. at 648. 
 82.  See id.  
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2. A Critical Review of the Product Market-Based Account 
The PMBA is the first meaningful attempt to solve Gilson’s riddle, yet 
it has remained uncharted at large.  Indeed, the PMBA is a creative and 
path-breaking study because it analyzes the corporate governance puzzle 
between a controller and minority shareholders from an analytical 
framework in relation to a product market.  As with most pioneering 
theories, however, the PMBA might not provide clear answers in some 
circumstances.  First, how a controlling shareholder’s signal is sent from a 
capital market—by treating minority shareholders fairly—to a product 
market may be too convoluted to be realistic.  Sharing this view, Professors 
Gordon and Milhaupt have raised questions about the PMBA’s indirect 
path of a controlling shareholder’s signaling.  Based on Professor Gilson’s 
explanation, suppose that the controlling stakeholder’s primary concern is 
the reputation of the controlled corporation within a product market.  Why 
then would he not show his integrity and honesty directly in a product 
market rather than treating minority shareholders fairly in a capital market 
and subsequently sending off this signal to the product market?83 
Second, the role of local newspapers in improving the quality of 
corporate governance should be closely interpreted.  According to the 
PMBA, 
[s]uppose that the treatment of minority shareholders is visible to 
a company’s potential trading partners at a low cost, perhaps 
because such exploitation is covered by the local newspapers.  
Fair treatment of minority shareholders then serves as evidence 
of the corporation’s integrity, including its commitment to 
performing its contractual obligations . . . .84 
This implies that local newspapers functions as a low-cost conduit for 
sending information from a capital market to a product market.  However, 
it is noteworthy that jurisdictions at issue in the PMBA are bad-law 
countries where we are concerned about the integrity of large corporations 
and the efficiency of the legal systems.  Therefore, it is difficult to trust the 
integrity and efficiency of the local newspapers in those same 
jurisdictions.85 
 
 83.  Discussion with Jeffrey Gordon and Curtis Milhaupt, Professors, Columbia Law 
School, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
 84.  Gilson, supra note 5, at 648 (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
 85.  Professor Gilson seems to admit this point, although he emphasizes the role of the 
press as an efficient corporate governance tool.  “Luca Enriques has pointed out that the role 
of the financial press may be limited to a handful of developed countries where there is a 
widespread confidence in the newspapers’ journalistic integrity.  Absent that confidence, 
they cannot play the contemplated ‘shaming’ role.”  Id. at 648 n.37 (citing E-mail from Luca 
Enriques, Professor of Law, University of Bologna, and Commissioner, Commissione 
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More importantly, it should be noted that the integrity of local 
newspapers could be significantly damaged due to the very nature of 
corporate groups, a common business organization in many developing 
countries.  It is not uncommon for a corporate group to consist of more than 
a score of affiliated corporations.  Then, it is likely that the corporate group 
has a media corporation as well, such that the media corporation is directly 
under the influence of the group’s controlling shareholder.86  Even if a 
corporate group does not have such a corporation, the group has enormous 
influence on the media industry via the sale of advertisements to the press.  
Therefore, it is commonplace that local newspapers are biased towards 
controlling family shareholders.  Simply put, the media is generally not a 
fourth branch of the government in such countries. 
In addition, contrary to the PMBA’s explanation, it might be difficult 
for potential trading partners in a product market to effectively notice a 
corporation’s treatment of minority shareholders. 87   Even to large 
institutional investors, who are experts in interpreting information from 
public corporations in a capital market, examining a particular controlling 
shareholder’s treatment of investors is costly.  Then, by and large trading 
partners—experts on a product market—are less able to interpret capital 
market information as efficiently as institutional investors.  Thus, it would 
be difficult for trading partners to recognize these signals at a low cost. 
As aforementioned, the PMBA explains if a controlling shareholder 
treats minority shareholders fairly, it would be a good signal to a product 
market that the controller is not going to cheat his trading partners.88  
However, it is questionable whether trading partners really think of a 
corporation’s treatment of other parties including its minority shareholders, 
as a primary standard when they transact with the corporation.  Rather, 
trading partners are often willing to acquiesce to a corporation’s 
misconduct as long as the corporation abides by contracts. 
For example, although it is widely alleged that Samsung Group has 
serious corporate governance problems (and thus the interest of minority 
shareholders is arguably damaged),89 Apple—a large trading partner of 
 
Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), to Ronald J. Gilson, Charles J. Meyers 
Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School (Nov. 24, 2006) (on file with author)). 
 86.  In other words, many corporate groups have unrelated diversified business 
portfolios.  Therefore, it is possible that, for example, a corporate group with a semi-
conductor affiliate company has a newspaper subsidiary as well as a leisure business 
subsidiary. 
 87.  Professors Jeffrey Gordon and Curtis Milhaupt have shared a similar idea with me 
on this question.  Discussion with Jeffrey Gordon and Curtis Milhaupt, Professors, 
Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
 88.  Gilson, supra note 5, at 648. 
 89.  For a discussion of the corporate governance problems created by the Samsung 
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Samsung Electronics—has purchased important components (e.g., flash 
memory chips) from Samsung Electronics for its iPhone.90  To be sure, 
Apple has tried to reduce its dependence on Samsung, but this has largely 
been due to its hostile relationship with Samsung over intellectual property 
issues in many jurisdictions and its strategic efforts to diversify its 
suppliers.91  Another example can be found in the relationship between 
Apple and Foxconn in China.  Foxconn, a major supplier of Apple, is 
infamous for allegedly inhumane working conditions.92  Nonetheless, it 
initially seemed that Apple had been apathetic to Foxconn’s mistreatment 
of its employees.  These examples show how a corporation’s treatment of 
third parties—including its minority shareholders or lay-workers—do not 
always function as a useful indicator of a corporation’s trustworthiness to 
trading partners.93   
Moreover, the PMBA is not fit for explaining an export-oriented 
developing economy—many successful emerging markets fall into this 
category—where a corporation has foreign trading partners.94  It might be 
difficult for trading partners in a “foreign product” market (Country A) to 
be able to effectively observe and examine a corporation’s conduct in a 
“domestic capital” market (Country B).  One may argue that newspapers in 
developed foreign countries report about a controlling shareholder’s 
treatment of minority shareholders in a bad-law jurisdiction.  If this is the 
case, then the problem of local press independence is solved as well.95   
Foreign trading partners may be able to receive relevant information 
on a controlling shareholder’s integrity from a distinguished and 
 
Group’s controlling family shareholder, see Kang-Il Lee, Kun-Hee Lee, Not Guilty in a 
Criminal Court, But Liable in a Civil Court, HANKOOK DAILY (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/society/201208/h2012082216425322000.htm. 
90.  Apple and Samsung’s Symbiotic Relationship: Slicing an Apple, ECONOMIST (Aug. 
10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/08/apple-and-samsungs-
symbiotic-relationship (“Together, [Samsung’s products] account for 26% of the component 
cost of an iPhone.”). 
 91.  Jessica E. Lessin, Lorraine Luk & Juro Osawa, Apple Finds It Difficult to Divorce 
Samsung, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578513882349940500 
(“In the past year, Apple executives have expressed concern that their dependence on 
Samsung limits Apple’s ability to control its destiny by constricting Apple’s negotiating 
power and ability to use different technologies . . . .”). 
 92.  See Ulianne Pepitone, Foxconn Workers Strike over iPhone 5 Demands, Labor 
Group Says, CNN Money (Oct. 7, 2012), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/05/technology/mobile/foxconn-iphone-5-strike/index.html. 
 93.  Compare with the PMBA.   
 94.  Professor Curtis Milhaupt suggested this issue.  Discussion with Curtis Milhaupt, 
Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
 95.  For a discussion of the local press independence problem, see supra notes 84-86 
and accompanying text. 
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independent press in a developed country in a more neutral manner.  
Perhaps, sophisticated business newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal 
or Financial Times delve into the macroeconomic environment and general 
characteristics of a particular country.  However, it is highly unlikely that 
those newspapers would examine “one particular” controlling shareholder’s 
treatment of minority shareholders in a particular developing economy.  
Even if they did, the probability of these media sources writing a review of 
a particular controlling shareholder is so low that it would be rational for 
the controller to ignore that possibility.  In addition, as seen in the 
Samsung-Apple and Foxconn-Apple examples, foreign trading partners—
even if they know a corporation’s misconduct—have little reason to raise 
such an issue as long as the corporation treats its trading partners in a 
favorable way.96  In sum, a controlling shareholder in an export-oriented 
developing country hardly has reasonable grounds to send a costly signal 
from a “domestic capital” market to a “foreign product” markets. 
Furthermore, the imperfect industrial organizations in many 
developing countries weaken the logic of the PMBA as well.  The PMBA 
implies that a corporation caters to trading partners in a product market.97  
When a corporation is located in a relatively competitive market (e.g., the 
United States), trading partners face a more favorable situation because 
they can use competitive pressure among corporations.98  However, in 
markets where a few large corporations form a (quasi) monopoly in almost 
every product market, each large corporation has powerful leverage vis-à-
vis trading partners.  This kind of relationship describes the general 
contours of the bad-law jurisdictions covered by the PMBA. 
In these jurisdictions, just as corporate law systems are ineffective, 
competition law systems are not effective in regulating the misconduct of 
large corporations (and controlling shareholders).99  Thus, the prevailing 
phenomenon in developing countries is often described as “Strong 
Controlling Shareholders, Weak Trading Partners.” 100   Under these 
 
 96.  Of course, it is possible that in the future Apple could use Samsung Group’s 
corporate governance issues for its business strategy purpose. 
 97.  For example, according to the PMBA, a (family-controlled) corporation sends a 
costly signal to trading partners in order to show its integrity.  See Gilson, supra note 5, at 
648-49.  In this sense, the PMBA seems to indicate the corporation’s weak position vis-à-vis 
its trading partners. 
 98.  In general, it is explained that the U.S. market is more competitive than markets in 
the rest of the world. 
 99.  In other words, the correlation between the quality of corporate law and the quality 
of competition law is very high. 
 100.  This expression is borrowed from the title of Professor Roe’s book.  MARK J. ROE, 
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:  THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (Princeton University Press 1994).  In a bad-law jurisdiction, powerful market 
players are generally large family-controlled corporate groups (and their controlling 
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circumstances, the controlling shareholder of a large corporation does not 
have to send costly signals about fair dealings with minority shareholders 
in order to attract trading partners.  In other words, it is trading partners 
(rather than a controlling shareholder) that should convince the other party 
that they are credible, which is exactly opposite of the PMBA’s main 
argument.101 
3. When Cash Flow Rights and Voting Rights Are Significantly 
Detached 
Depending on the reinforced pecking order theory102—the cost of 
equity is substantially higher than the cost of debt to a corporation in a bad-
law country103—the PMBA concludes that a controlling shareholder’s 
decision to rely on an equity market is not explained through capital 
market-based accounts.  Rather, the PMBA hypothesizes that a corporation 
sends off the signal of its integrity to trading partners in a product market 
(by showing that the corporation treats minority shareholders fairly), even 
if that signaling imposes a financial cost on the corporation (i.e., issuing 
stocks at a discounted price).104  To a corporation in a developing country, 
perhaps the benefit of maintaining good reputation in a product market may 
exceed the cost of signaling.105  In this Subpart, I explore the above 
reasoning by paying attention to the following questions:  (1) when issuing 
stocks at the discounted price, who will ultimately bear the extra financial 
costs, and how much?;  (2) who makes the ultimate decision on the capital 
structure of a corporation, and what matters most to him? 
Indeed, if a corporation’s cost of equity is much higher than the cost 
of debt, then the corporation has no good capital market justification to 
issue new equities.  Thus, if a corporation issues new shares to the public, it 
may have product market rationales as the PMBA describes.106  However, 
this reasoning misses an important point as to the definition of a 
“corporation.”  Since a corporation is a fictitious legal person,107  the 
 
shareholders).  On the other hand, their trading partners are often small corporations. 
 101.  For the comparison with the PMBA’s main argument, see supra note 97 and 
accompanying text. 
 102.  Gilson, supra note 5, at 647. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 647-48. 
 105.  Professor Gilson articulates the significant role of the reputational mechanism in 
the PMBA.  See Gilson, supra note 5, at 648. 
 106.  However, it does not mean that there must be product market rationales. 
 107.  See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (Harvard University Press 1996) (explaining “[t]he ‘personhood’ of 
a corporation is a matter of convenience rather than reality . . . .”); Gilson, supra note 5, at 
640-41 (“As a formal matter, a corporation is just a long-lived piece of paper on which 
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ultimate and real cost-bearer and beneficiary of corporate transactions is 
not the corporation, but shareholders (in particular, natural persons).  In 
addition, in the deep CMS where a controlling shareholder’s economic 
interest in a corporation is low, the controlling shareholder’s personal cost 
of equity financing could be minimal, even if the corporation’s cost is high. 
Consider a controlling shareholder in a bad-law country who would 
like to raise external capital.  Suppose that the fundamental value108 of 
either debt instruments or equity securities that a corporation issues is $10 
million.  As the reinforced pecking order theory in a bad-law country 
implies,109 however, a corporation’s cost of equity finance is substantially 
higher than that of debt finance.110  Put differently, equity issuance is 
subject to a deep discount in a capital market due to distrust among market 
participants.  Accordingly, the corporation would receive less proceeds in 
an equity market than in a debt market.  Then, for example, while the 
corporation receives $10 million through debt instruments, the corporation 
could receive only $8 million through equity issuance.  In this case, the 
additional cost of the equity that the corporation bears is $2 million. 
However, it is noteworthy that the extra cost of $2 million when 
selecting equity finance will be borne by the “corporation.”  A controlling 
shareholder’s primary interest may not be the total cost of equity financing 
to a corporation, even though it is important to the corporation.  Of greater 
significance to a controlling shareholder is his personal cost of equity 
finance.  When a controlling shareholder holds a fractional ownership, α—
which is between 0 (i.e., 0%) and 1 (i.e., 100%)—his personal extra cost in 
selecting equity financing over debt financing is only a fraction of a 
corporation’s additional cost, $ α x 2 million.111  The rest of the additional 
expense will be borne by all of the non-dominant shareholders. 
According to the conventional CS model,112 a controlling shareholder 
will take most of the benefits and costs occurring in any decision and 
transaction made in a controlled corporation because the controlling 
 
appears the corporation’s charter.”). 
 108.  In principle, “[f]undamental value is the price that would prevail if the market 
consisted entirely of rational investors who possessed all available information (i.e., the 
price that would prevail in a truly efficient market).”  Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, 
Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic 
Performance:  The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 349 n.47 (2003). 
 109.  As for the reinforced pecking order theory, see supra notes 67-69 and 
accompanying text. 
 110.  Gilson, supra note 5, at 647. 
 111.  A controlling shareholder’s personal extra cost and a corporation’s cost in selecting 
equity finance are the same only when the shareholder contributes 100% of the equity 
capital to the corporation. 
 112.  Recall that cash flow rights and voting rights of a CS controlling shareholder are 
approximately aligned.  
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shareholder holds the vast majority of the cash flow rights.  Here, the 
economic incentives of the corporation and the controller are generally 
aligned.113  For example, when a controlling shareholder holds 90% of the 
economic interest of a corporation, he bears 90% of the additional cost of 
capital, i.e., $1.8 million in the example.114  Under these circumstances, if 
the controlling shareholder decides to choose equity financing that costs 
more than debt financing, the decision to issue new shares would not likely 
be made based on a capital market rationale, as the PMBA explains.  
Instead, it is probable that the PMBA’s rationale—building a reputation of 
integrity in a product market—may be able to explain the controller’s 
decision to raise equity capital.115 
A limitation of the above explanation is, however, that this view is 
incapable of explaining another large subset of controlling shareholder 
regimes, i.e., the CMS.  In a deep CMS corporation where the cash flow 
rights and voting rights of a controlling shareholder are significantly 
separated,116 the economic incentive of the corporation and the controlling 
shareholder can be substantially detached.  Accordingly, the controlling 
shareholder’s personal burden in equity finance is only a small part of the 
corporation’s cost.  Suppose that a CMS controlling shareholder holds only 
5% of cash flow rights of a business group.117   This example is not 
uncommon in countries with the CMS.  As explained, controlling family 
shareholders of large corporate groups in Korea hold 5.04% of ownership 
on average.118  A self-interested controlling shareholder’s primary criterion 
for judgment when deciding the method of finance is not the corporation’s 
cost ($2 million), but his personal cost (0.05 x $2 million = $100,000).119  
Therefore, the fact that the cost of equity finance is much higher than that 
 
 113.  It is a primary reason why managerial agency problems can be rectified more as the 
economic interest of a controlling shareholder increases.  “Large shareholders thus address 
the agency problem in that they both have a general interest in profit maximization, and 
enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interest respected.”  Andrei Shleifer 
& Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 754 (1997). 
 114.  0.9 x 2 million dollars = 1.8 million dollars. 
 115.  However, it is noteworthy that building reputation of integrity in a product market 
is merely a possible answer to the expensive equity financing.  For a similar explanation, see 
also supra note 106 and its accompanying text.  
 116.  As for the CMS, see supra note 21. 
 117.  In this Article, a “business group” and a “corporate group” are used 
interchangeably. 
 118.  See Korea Exchange, supra note 43.  As discussed, on average controlling 
shareholders in large corporate groups in Korea personally hold 2.62% of economic interest 
in groups.  Including their family members’ economic interest, the number reaches 5.04%.  
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 119.  Due to a CMS controlling shareholder’s capability to separate his personal interest 
and a corporation’s interest, it is known that a CMS corporation tends to generate serious 
corporate governance problems.        
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of debt finance to a corporation does not significantly constrain a CMS 
controlling shareholder’s desire to raise equity capital.  A controlling 
shareholder can simply make minority shareholders pay 95% of the extra 
cost of equity financing.120 
In sum, the question at issue should not be why a “corporation” in a 
developing country has many minority shareholders even if the cost of 
equity to a “corporation” is substantially (e.g., $2 million) higher than the 
cost of debt.  The theory of the PMBA is based on this incorrect question.  
The more precise question is why a “controlling shareholder” in a 
developing country has so many minority shareholders even if the cost of 
equity to a “controlling shareholder” is slightly (e.g., $100,000) higher than 
the cost of debt to him.121  Under the analysis of this question, a controlling 
shareholder’s choice of equity finance is not irrational even from the 
capital market perspective, when a corporation’s collective interest and a 
controlling shareholder’s private interest are separate.  This implies that the 
PMBA’s theory is less compelling as an explanation of Gilson’s riddle in 
deep CMS regimes. 
II. WHY DOES A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER RELY ON EXPENSIVE 
EQUITY FINANCING AND HAVE MANY MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS? 
One may argue that, to a controlling shareholder, equity finance is still 
more expensive than debt financing, even when his economic interest in a 
corporation is significantly low.  For instance, in the CMS example above, 
a controller has to bear $100,000.  An economically reasonable controlling 
shareholder—even if he is in a deep CMS—would always choose debt 
financing over equity financing since he has no reason to pay even a penny 
more.  The question then is:  why in reality does a controller in a 
developing country issue new shares? 
A. The Additional Cost of Equity Finance Is Opportunity Cost 
One possible answer to Gilson’s riddle is that a controlling 
shareholder’s additional cost of equity financing is not out-of-pocket cost.  
Consider this account based on the numerical example above.122  It is 
 
 120.  Another derivative question is how a controlling shareholder is able to set up a 
corporate group and the CMS in the first place.  Professor Jesse Fried at Harvard Law 
School also raised this question during discussion with the Author.  The question of 
dynamic formation process of a CMS corporate group is beyond the scope of this Article, 
and further research will be conducted in an independent project. 
 121.  In Part II, I examine the possibility that equity financing is not costly but beneficial 
to a controlling shareholder, when taking other factors into account. 
 122.  See supra notes 108-120 and accompanying text for a numerical example. 
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noteworthy that a controlling shareholder’s cost of equity finance—
$100,000—incurs not because he pays $100,000 more to public investors 
but because he receives $100,000 less from public investors.  Put 
differently, the controlling shareholder receives the smaller amount of 
proceeds from equity financing although he could have received the larger 
amount if he chooses debt financing.  In this respect, the additional cost of 
equity financing is similar to opportunity cost.  
In theory, a rational economic person treats opportunity cost (or 
“receiving less” in this example) in the same way as out-of-pocket cost (or 
“paying more”).  In reality, however, opportunity cost tends to be neglected 
to a greater extent than out-of-pocket cost.  This tendency could be 
reinforced as a controlling shareholder’s economic interest in a corporation 
becomes smaller.  For example, when the cost of equity finance to a 
corporation is $2 million and a controlling shareholder’s economic interest 
in the corporation is 1%, his personal opportunity cost is only $20,000.  
Accordingly, it is likely that he is less concerned about the cost of equity 
finance.  In fact, controlling shareholders holding less than 1% of economic 
interest are not completely unrealistic, as seen in the aforementioned 
example of Chairman Choi, who holds merely 0.04% of economic interest 
of SK Group.123 
B. Tunneling v. Additional Cost of Equity Financing 
Tunneling 124 —the phenomenon where a controlling shareholder 
siphons corporate value at the expense of minority shareholders—is 
rampant in bad-law countries.125  Having more public shareholders could be 
economically beneficial to a controlling shareholder in bad-law 
jurisdictions since he may receive more private benefits through tunneling.  
However, because prospective investors discount the share price of a 
corporation in response to tunneling, equity financing (resulting in more 
minority shareholders) is costly to the controlling shareholder.126  Each 
party’s response is dynamic and may continue.127  Ultimately, whether the 
combination of equity financing and tunneling creates net value to a 
controlling shareholder depends on the relative size of both effects. 
 
 123.  Yun, supra note 46. 
 124.  See generally Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 
J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008) (discussing the anti-self-dealing index); Johnson et al., supra note 
12 (describing an overview of tunneling in the controlling investor context). 
 125.  As for insufficient investor protection in controlling shareholder regimes, see, e.g., 
La Porta et al., supra note 1. 
 126.  Recall the pecking order theory.  See generally Myers & Majluf, supra note 63; see 
also Gilson, supra note 5, at 647. 
 127.  See supra Part I.B. 
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Accordingly, there are three scenarios relating to tunneling and equity 
financing by a controlling shareholder:  (1) a controlling shareholder takes 
the exact same amount of private benefits of control via tunneling as the 
cost incurred by equity finance (net value to a controller is zero); (2) he 
takes more private benefits of control than the equity financing cost (net 
value to a controller is positive); or (3) he takes less private benefits of 
control than the equity financing cost (net value to a controller is negative).  
Since a controlling shareholder knows the size of his tunneling and the 
extra cost of equity financing while minority shareholders do not,128 the 
controlling shareholder knows the scenario in which he is involved. 
Consider the first scenario.  A fair equilibrium between a controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders is achieved through the controlling 
shareholder’s “disciplined” expropriation—in this respect, the controlling 
shareholder is “honest.”  Interestingly, the controlling shareholder acts 
fairly and honestly in this scenario because he steals exactly the same 
amount of corporate assets as the cost that he loses from the discount made 
by public investors during the equity issuance, instead of refraining from 
stealing at all.129  Because equity financing ultimately is not a bad or 
expensive choice to controlling shareholders, Gilson’s riddle is solved in 
this first scenario. 
Gilson’s riddle is solved in the second scenario as well since a 
controlling shareholder attains positive net value after the combination of 
equity financing and tunneling.  This scenario raises an additional question:  
why do minority shareholders accept such unfair transactions in a capital 
market? 130   First, this could possibly be because imperfect market 
conditions make minority shareholders follow unfair market terms because 
either:  (1) asymmetric information can obfuscate public investors; or, (2) 
the presence of the quasi-monopolistic power of controlling shareholders as 
dominant market players may prevent public investors from discounting in 
proportion to the extent of controlling shareholders’ expropriation.  Second, 
minority shareholders may accept such transactions because they are 
rationally apathetic individualists. 131   Although the total amount of 
 
 128.  It could happen because of asymmetric information between a corporate insider 
and public investors.  As for asymmetric information, see generally Akerlof, supra note 55 
(examining deterioration in markets with asymmetric information). 
 129.  In a similar way, Professor Black boldly claims “once a company has issued shares 
at a discount, the insiders may feel entitled to appropriate most of the company’s value for 
themselves.”  Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong 
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 806 (2001). 
 130.  As for a further discussion of this question (i.e., the flipside of Gilson’s riddle), see 
infra Part III. 
 131.  For an explanation of the rational apathy of shareholders, see Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, 32 REGULATION 42, 47 (2009) (explaining that 
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corporate value that a controlling shareholder illicitly transfers to himself 
from all of the minorities—in other words, the collective damage of all 
minorities—might be an important issue to minorities, they are more 
interested in their own individual losses caused by a controller’s extraction 
when they invest in a corporation.  Thus, as long as the expropriation rate 
imposed by a controlling shareholder is low, individual minority 
shareholders are likely to tolerate such “generous stealing” even though the 
collective damage is large. 
The analysis has another important implication from the perspective of 
a controlling shareholder.  Even if a controlling shareholder illicitly takes 
only a small amount from each minority shareholder, the aggregate amount 
that he steals may be huge when there are many minority shareholders (put 
differently, when he is a deep CMS controller).  Accordingly, it would be 
better for him to be a “generous thief” by reducing his expropriation rate 
imposed on individual minorities.  If almost all of controllers are thieves, a 
generous thief can attract more public investors, enlarging the base of his 
expropriation.  These considerations provide an answer to why a 
controlling shareholder might voluntarily set a limit to the amount of 
private benefits he takes.132 
In the third scenario, a controlling shareholder chooses to take less 
corporate assets than the cost incurred by equity finance,133 such that 
Gilson’s riddle remains valid.  If the controlling shareholder attains benefits 
from other sources related to equity financing, then Gilson’s riddle would 
be solved.  The following Subparts C and D discuss the benefits derived 
from business expansion by a controlling shareholder. 
C. Non-Pecuniary Private Benefits of Empire-Building 
“Empire-building”134 is a phenomenon wherein a top decision-maker 
 
rational apathy is a reasonable option to most of minority shareholders). 
 132.  This question is raised by Professor Gilson in Controlling Family Shareholders in 
Developing Countries, supra note 5.  Gilson’s answer is based on the PMBA.  “Part IV then 
speculates on why a controlling family shareholder might voluntarily limit the amount of 
private benefit extraction from minority shareholders—not because the treatment of 
minority shareholders affects the controlled corporation’s ability to raise additional equity 
capital, but because bad behavior will degrade its reputation in the product market.”  Id. at 
637.  In contrast, my answer in this Subpart is based on notions of a controlling shareholder 
as a “generous thief” and minority shareholders as rationally apathetic individuals.  A 
“stationary controller” is another form of “generous thieves.”  As for the theory of stationary 
controllers, see generally Kang, supra note 27; see also infra Part II.E and Part III.A. 
 133.  Then, it is possible that minority shareholders are not financially damaged by a 
controlling shareholder’s expropriation.  For the more related explanation of this possibility, 
see infra Part III.D. 
 134.  As to the phenomenon of empire-building, Professors Shleifer and Vishny explain 
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of a corporation—either a CEO or a controlling shareholder—expands the 
size of the corporation for his own interest despite it being inefficient to the 
corporation.  A controlling shareholder may create both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary benefits by enlarging the corporation.135  However, this Subpart 
pays attention to the non-pecuniary benefits—such as social prestige, 
reputation, psychological benefits, and social influence—reaped by a 
controlling shareholder. 
1. How Can Empire-Building Generate Non-Pecuniary Private 
Benefits? 
There are several significant points—which are not covered well by 
the extant literature—when exploring the impacts of empire-building on the 
corporate governance practices of developing countries.  First of all, in 
many bad-law countries, a small number of corporations—and as a result, a 
small number of controlling shareholders—dominate the entire economy, 
which is markedly different from the United States.  For example, although 
Apple (or Microsoft) is one of the largest corporations in the United States, 
it is too small to dominate the largest market in the world—as a result, 
Steven Jobs (or Bill Gates) is only one of many successful business people 
in the economy.136  In contrast, although the largest corporation in a 
developing country is not comparable to Apple (or Microsoft) in terms of 
any economic indicator, it may account for a significant portion of a 
relatively small market, and so a handful of business tycoons may 
command the economy.  Due to their unchallenged position, controlling 
 
that “[g]reater costs are incurred when managers have an interest in expanding the firm 
beyond what is rational, reinvesting the free cash, pursuing pet projects, and so on.”  
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 113, at 742.  In the United States, the phenomenon of empire-
building has been often observed in the M&A context.  “[T]he Empire Building Hypothesis 
suggests that the most important conflict of interests in corporate control contest may be on 
the bidder’s side of the transaction—between the interests of the bidder’s management and 
those of its own shareholders.”  O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 759 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2006). 
 135.  Managers often desire to expand the influence of their business by managing large 
corporations.  In particular, the empire-building account explains that managers in an 
acquiring corporation tend to pay a higher takeover premium to a target corporation since 
managing a larger corporation is more beneficial to managers.  For example, according to 
Professors Shleifer & Vishiny, “Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny . . . find that bidder returns 
tend to be the lowest when bidders diversify or when they buy rapidly growing firms.” 
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 113, at 746 (citing Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert 
Vishny, Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31 (1990)).  As is 
widely known, executive compensation is often positively correlated to the size of the 
corporations.  In addition, corporate insiders can attain more psychological satisfaction by 
ruling a larger “empire.” 
136.   See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 4, at 1666. 
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shareholders of large corporations in less developed countries are highly 
respected and envied, enjoying immense reputation, social prestige, and 
other psychological benefits137 (including the jealousy of others).  This 
tendency can be amplified more in countries with business “groups” 
because the economic power is more concentrated among fewer controlling 
shareholders who dictate dozens of large affiliated firms.138  In short, being 
a controlling shareholder in a large corporation or business group is 
psychologically rewarding, and the larger a corporation (or a corporate 
group) is, the more non-pecuniary benefits a controlling shareholder can 
attain.139 
In addition, controlling shareholders are often treated as national 
leaders.  The disproportionately large economic power of controlling 
shareholders makes it possible that, by various means, they have direct 
social influence and even political power among people in the street and 
the government.140  In many authoritarian regimes,141 which are usually 
developing countries, it is true that the government is above the business.142  
However, if a few business people are key players in the market, they can 
talk directly and personally with the government as its leading partners 
despite the hierarchy between the government and business.  In extreme 
cases, business elites of large corporations become the highest political 
figures in their countries.  Notable examples are Thaksin in Thailand and 
Berlusconi in Italy (although Italy is one of the G-7 economies, it is 
recognized by many scholars as a country with insufficient investor 
 
 137.  As for a related view, see id.  Media attention could be another form of non-
pecuniary benefits to a controlling shareholder who would like to be famous. 
 138.  Suppose that the size of domestic economies of countries A and B are same.  There 
are 100 large corporations in countries A and B.  Country A is dominated by corporate 
groups.  Each corporate group has 20 corporations as affiliated firms.  Corporations in 
country B are stand-alone corporations.  Accordingly, there are 5 controlling shareholders in 
country A and 100 controlling shareholders in country B.  Consequently, country A with the 
corporate group system is more concentrated than country B with the stand-alone 
corporation system. 
 139.  In this sense, it can be said that the size of a corporation is a proxy of non-
pecuniary benefits to a controlling shareholder.  For a further discussion of the size of a 
corporation, see infra note 148.   
 140.  To the contrary, managers in large U.S. corporations form strong lobbies as a 
group, such as Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but managers are 
seldom influential in making policies individually. 
 141.  For a further explanation of the relationship between an authoritarian government 
and businesspeople, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically 
Benevolent Dictators:  Lessons for Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011) 
(examining the interactions and roles of dictators and business elites in developing 
countries). 
 142.  An example is the government-business relation in former president Chung-Hee 
Park’s regime in Korea.  Id. 
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protection,143 a jurisdiction at issue in this Article). 
Moreover, the length of tenure as a corporate decision-maker makes 
empire-building far more attractive to controlling shareholders in 
developing countries than to CEOs in the United States.  In the United 
States, the term of a typical top manager generally lasts for several years.144  
In that sense, a business empire is “leased” to him for a short duration.  In 
contrast, a controlling shareholder in a country with poor investor 
protection usually remains the dictator of a corporation for his entire life, if 
he wishes.  In addition, since a controlling shareholder’s children will 
inherit his capacity after he retires or dies, the tenure of a controlling family 
shareholder is practically infinite. 145   A controlling shareholder is, 
therefore, conceived as “owning” a business empire as his personal 
“property.” 
A top manager of a large public corporation in the United States is 
analogous to a consul in ancient Rome.  Although he is influential and may 
be the sole decision-maker in a corporation, he must leave the office after a 
fixed number of years.  Ultimately, Rome is not the consul’s empire but a 
people’s republic, even if the republic is under his dictatorship.  To the 
contrary, a controlling shareholder in a developing country is comparable 
to an emperor (or princeps, i.e., the first citizen like Augustus) of Rome.  
He can stay in office as long as he is alive, and eventually his children will 
succeed his throne—thus, Rome will be maintained as his dynasty.  In that 
context, a typical corporation in the United States is only a pseudo-empire 
to its CEO, because the current CEO in a dispersed shareholding firm is 
generally not able to appoint his child as the next CEO. 
It is, therefore, clear that building a larger empire will provide more 
glory (i.e., non-pecuniary private benefits) to a controlling shareholder in a 
controlling shareholder regime than to a top manager in a dispersed 
shareholder regime.  In addition, it is plausible that the CEO of a widely 
held firm does not have sufficient incentive to expand the territory of the 
corporate empire in the last period of his term since the fruits of his effort 
 
 143.  See, e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 113, at 739; Gilson, supra note 4, at 1655. 
 144.  Quoting Booze Allen Hamilton study, Professor Gordon explains that the average 
CEO tenure in the United States in 2001 is 7.3 years.  The average fired CEO tenure in the 
same year is 4.6 years.  Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950 - 2005:  Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Price, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 
1533 (2007). 
 145.  For example, Gilson’s PMBA in Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing 
Countries is based on a notion of a controlling family shareholder as a controller with 
infinite tenure.  “[F]amily ownership solves the intergenerational transfer process rather 
elegantly. Because of intrafamily inheritance and family ties, the current generation of 
decision makers, at least in functional family businesses, treats the next generation’s utility 
as the equivalent of their own, so there is no temporal distortion of incentives to invest in 
reputation.”  Gilson, supra note 5, at 643. 
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will accrue to the next “consul,” to whom the current one has no biological 
relationship. 146   In contrast, a controlling shareholder in developing 
countries may have an equal incentive to pursue empire-building 
throughout his life since the expanded empire will ultimately belong to his 
children.147 
2. External Equity Financing Is Essential for Empire-Building 
So far, I have explained that a controlling shareholder can attain a 
significant part of non-pecuniary benefits by empire-building.  How, then, 
is empire-building embodied in a concrete way, and what are the 
implications of empire-building in relation to equity finance?  In general, 
large corporations refer to corporations with large assets.148  From an 
accountant’s perspective, as the size of the assets (i.e., the left side of 
balance sheet) increases, the sum of the debt and equity (i.e., the right side 
of balance sheet) should increase to the same extent.149  According to the 
pecking order theory, when external capital is required by a corporation, a 
controlling shareholder may initially prefer to rely on debt (especially bank 
loans).150  During this period, as assets increase, debt increases to the same 
extent, and the size of the equity remains constant.  Consequently, a growth 
strategy that depends solely on debt financing raises the leverage ratio of a 
business group.  As the debt-equity ratio deteriorates, however, the 
financial distress costs increase.151 
A corporation could sustain “high” leverage (e.g., a 500% debt-to-
equity ratio), even if it creates enormous inefficiency in the capital 
structure.  However, at some point, a controlling shareholder’s empire-
building strategy financed solely by debt is impractical for two reasons:  (1) 
the financial distress costs of “extremely high” leverage (e.g., 5,000% debt-
to-equity ratio) far exceed the benefits, such that the corporation is unable 
to endure the burden;152 and (2) the debt market would no longer make 
 
 146.  Simply put, in general a CEO faces a final period problem when it comes to 
empire-building.  See also Gilson, supra note 5, at 641 (but, note that Professor Gilson 
explains a corporate insider’s final period problem in relation to the corporation’s 
contractual obligations in a product market.).    
 147.  In other words, in general a controlling shareholder does not face a final period 
problem.  As for a controlling shareholder with an infinite tenure, see supra note 145. 
 148.  A large corporation might be a corporation with a large number of employees, 
large sales or assets.  Nonetheless, in developing countries, the number of employees and 
the magnitude of sales and assets are generally correlated with each other.  In that sense, the 
size of the assets is a good proxy for measuring the size of the corporation. 
 149.  In short, the assets equals to the sum of liabilities and equities. 
 150.  As for the pecking order theory, see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
 151.  See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 65, at 477. 
 152.  See id.  
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loans to the corporation due to the fear of default even if the corporation is 
in search of more debt.  Accordingly, a controlling shareholder who seeks 
dynastic empire-building for him and his offspring eventually has to turn to 
equity financing from outside investors in the stock market.153  
It is true that the frequency of equity issuance is rare in a controlling 
shareholder system.154  To a dispersed shareholding firm’s CEO, who can 
remain in that post for only several years,155 the interval between equity 
financing looks long.  It is possible that a corporation is not going to issue 
new shares again within his tenure.  The same interval between two equity 
issuances, however, looks short to a controlled firm’s dominant shareholder 
whose time horizon is infinite.  In other words, the frequency of equity 
issuance is not deemed to be rare from the standpoint of the controlling 
shareholder who (and whose children) will repeatedly participate in the 
stock market.  A far-sighted controlling shareholder ought to be concerned 
about the next equity issuances.156  Accordingly, he has an incentive to 
voluntarily protect minority shareholders at least to some degree to attract 
public investors in the subsequent share issuances.  The need for capital in 
a stock market (as opposed to the PMBA)157 explains the decision to have 
minority shareholders if dynamism, such as the growth of a corporation 
over a long time horizon through dynastic succession, is taken into account. 
Although the above explanation is true in some situations, a 
controlling shareholder will not rely on external equities when the new 
equity threatens his interest as a controlling shareholder.  This argument 
may be relevant in the CS regime where a typical controlling shareholder 
holds a significant amount of shares in a corporation.  A controlling 
shareholder may decide to issue new shares as long as he is able to 
participate in the capital-raising as a dominant investor (who can maintain 
 
 153.  This Article emphasizes a controlling shareholder’s repeated participation in a 
capital market.  See infra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.  The controller’s conduct in 
a capital market can be analyzed by game theory as well.  For the broad explanation on 
game theory, see generally JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY:  AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 
(W.W. Norton & Co. 2nd ed. 2007) and AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, 
THINKING STRATEGICALLY:  THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY 
LIFE (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993). 
 154.  Gilson, supra note 5, at 646. 
 155.  As for a typical CEO’s term in his office, see Gordon, supra note 144, at 1533. 
 156.  Compare with Gilson, supra note 5 at 646 (explaining the skepticism of the 
controller’s need “to return to the capital market to raise the capital in the future”).          
 157. My analysis contrasts with Professor Gilson’s PMBA in Controlling Family 
Shareholders in Developing Countries.  The PMBA states that a controlling shareholder 
does not issue new shares for a capital market rationale (“The decision to have minority 
shareholders then can be explained not by the need for capital . . . , but as a way of 
developing reputation that will be valuable in the product market . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
Gilson, supra note 5, at 648. 
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the majority shareholder’s position after the new equity issuance).  He 
would not let the corporation issue new shares, if, for example, he does not 
have enough money to participate in the new equity issuance, since new 
issuance would reduce his equity holding under the critical level for 
control. 
This concern, however, is not very meaningful to a controlling 
shareholder in the CMS where a decrease in cash flow rights does not 
necessarily dilute a controlling shareholder’s voting rights in the same 
proportion.158  A CMS controller is effectively able to entrench his control 
position through voting leverage devices such as stock pyramiding.159  
Since new equity issuance does not critically reduce a CMS controller’s 
voting rights, equity financing is generally seen as a safe means to attain 
the goal of empire-building. 
To what extent, then, can a controlling shareholder enlarge his 
business when he raises capital from the stock market?  A numerical 
example can explain the relationship between the size of assets and the 
economic interest of a controlling shareholder in a more concrete way.  
Suppose that there are three corporations with three controlling 
shareholders who invest the same amount of money, $50 million in each 
corporation.  Three controlling shareholders hold 100%, 50%, and 5% of 
common stocks in corporations, respectively.  Apparently, the first 
controlling shareholder runs a CS-style corporation, whereas the third runs 
a CMS-style corporation.160  Then, the total equity of each corporation 
should be $50 million, $100 million, and $1 billion, correspondingly.  If 
each corporation is allowed to finance debts by 400% equity-to-debt ratio, 
the total assets of each corporation will be $250 million, $500 million, and 
$5 billion, respectively. 
 
  
 
 158.  Put differently, a controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights could be less than 50% 
without his participation in new equity issuance.  Due to the feature of one-share-multiple-
vote for a CMS controller, however, he can still maintain control by holding more than 50% 
voting rights. 
 159.  Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 3.  For a further analysis of a CMS controller’s 
entrenched control in M&A context, see generally Kang, supra note 53.   
 160.  In this example, for the sake of simplicity a CS corporation is defined as a 
corporation where a controlling shareholder’s economic interest is more than 50%.  A CMS 
corporation is a corporation where a controlling shareholder’s economic interest is less than 
50%.  Therefore, it can be said that the second controlling shareholder runs either a CS or a 
CMS corporation. 
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TABLE 2:  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER’S 
ECONOMIC INTEREST AND THE SIZE OF A CORPORATE EMPIRE 
 
 
 
CORP. 1 CORP. 2 
 
CORP. 3 
 
Amount of a 
Controlling 
Shareholder’s 
Equity 
$ 50 million $ 50 million $ 50 million 
Controlling 
Shareholder’s 
Economic Interest 
100% 50% 5% 
Type of a 
Corporation’s 
Ownership 
 
CS 
 
CS / CMS 
 
CMS 
 
Total Equity of a 
Corporation 
$ 50 million $ 100 million $ 1 billion 
Total Debt of a 
Corporation 
$ 200 million $ 400 million $ 4 billion 
Total Asset Size 
(Asset = Equity + 
Debt) 
$ 250 million $ 500 million $ 5 billion 
 
Although these three controllers contribute the same value of capital, 
the third controlling shareholder who has 95% of equity from non-
dominant shareholders has an empire that is twenty times larger than that of 
the first who has no minorities at all.  Accordingly, the third controlling 
shareholder attains much larger non-pecuniary benefits than the first, since 
non-pecuniary benefits are positively related to the size of a corporation 
over which a controlling shareholder exercises control.  In consideration of 
non-pecuniary private benefits, the optimal choice for a controlling 
shareholder is to maintain the least cash flow rights in the corporation as 
long as his control is assured, other things being equal.  In addition, 
although most of the assets (99%) consist of other people’s money (i.e., 
equity and debt) in the third corporation, the only person who is able to 
consume non-pecuniary benefits exclusively is the third controller.161  The 
lesson is clear.  Having more external capital from an equity market 
 
 161.  In Corporation 3, a controlling shareholder’s capital contributed is $50 million and 
the corporation’s total assets are $5 billion (equity = $1 billion, debt = $4 billion).  Thus, a 
controlling shareholder’s equity is only 1% of the corporation’s total assets although he 
holds 5% of the corporation’s equity. 
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benefits a controlling shareholder in a sense that it increases the territory 
(i.e., the assets) of his empire.  The more equity capital a controlling 
shareholder has in his controlled corporation, the more debt he can bring 
into the corporation, and the larger corporation he would run.  This 
provides more non-pecuniary benefits to him.162  Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
a controlling shareholder in a developing country may have an incentive to 
attract more minority shareholders, despite expensive equity financing. 
3. Empire-Building and Its Cost—If Inefficient, Who Bears the Cost 
and by How Much? 
In general, empire-building is understood as the corporate insiders’ 
strategy of pursuing size maximization by adopting even negative NPV 
(net present value) projects.  Hence, the normative standard of the profit 
maximization is sacrificed.163  For example, managers in the United States 
in the 1960s commonly became preoccupied with conglomeration (i.e., 
empire-building).164  This wave of U.S. M&A is thought to have caused a 
significant level of inefficiency in the economy through unrelated 
diversification.  The next wave of M&A in the 1980s was mainly designed 
to rectify the inefficiency problem by means of divestiture.165  Since then, it 
has become common sense that unrelated diversification reduces 
profitability.166  “Focus” has been treated as a more reliable business norm 
than “diversification.”167  On the other hand, some of business groups—
 
 162.  Equity financing is essential for attaining more debt from outside.  Suppose that the 
debt-to-equity ratio is maintained at 400%.  Then, when a corporation issues $1 million of 
new equities, practically it is entitled to have additional $4 million through subsequent debt 
financing.  As the sum of equity and debt increases, the size of firm (the asset size) also 
increases.  Through this empire-building, a controller’s non-pecuniary benefits increase.  As 
a result, equity financing is a solid foundation for debt financing and non-pecuniary 
benefits. 
 163.  Empire-building of corporations is embodied by diversification through 
conglomerates or business groups.  The prevailing view in economics, management, and 
corporate governance is that corporate diversification destructs corporate value.  For this 
view, see generally Morck et al., supra note 135; Larry H. P. Lang & Rene M. Stulz, 
Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248 
(1994). 
 164.  For a brief explanation of merger waves including the conglomerate merger wave, 
see Bernard S. Black, The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and Last U.S. 
Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1999). 
 165.  For a brief description of the merger wave in the 1980s, see id. 
 166.  Tarun Khanna & Jan W. Rivkin, Estimating the Performance Effects of Business 
Groups in Emerging Markets, 22. STRAT. MGMT. J. 45, 45 (2001). 
 167.  For an explanation of this Western norm, see generally Tarun Khanna & Krishna 
Palepu, Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 
41 (1997); Khanna & Palepu, supra note 62. 
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results of empire-building, such as Korean chaebols—have achieved great 
success in the global market.  Whether empire-building is ultimately 
efficient or not is still a difficult question to resolve.  Putting aside that 
complicated debate, this Article’s analyses are in principle based on the 
assumption that empire-building is inefficient, and thus costly to all 
shareholders, including controlling shareholders. 168   Nonetheless, a 
controlling shareholder still has an incentive to continue unrelated 
diversification due to the disproportional features of his personal payoff 
scheme. 
Consider a controlling shareholder’s cost-benefit analysis in relation 
to empire-building.  On the one hand, virtually all non-pecuniary benefits 
ultimately belong to a controlling shareholder exclusively, no matter his 
economic interest in a corporation.169  On the other hand, the cost of the 
incremental inefficiency of expanding the empire is shared among all 
shareholders according to their pro-rata economic interest in a corporation.  
As a result, a controlling shareholder may find it more attractive to pursue 
empire-building when his economic interest in a business group is small.  
When a controlling shareholder has a deep CMS by having more minority 
shareholders, empire-building is more advantageous to him.  In this respect, 
Gilson’s riddle—why a controlling shareholder in a developing country has 
so many minority shareholders despite the high expense of equity 
financing—is at least partially solved. 
Why then do public investors tolerate the inefficiency cost of empire-
building by being minority shareholders?  If all corporations in a domestic 
market are indulged in inefficient empire-building, then public investors 
have no other choices unless international investment is available to them.  
In addition, while the cost that all minority shareholders should bear as a 
group is huge, the individual cost of each minority shareholder is small.  
For example, under a CMS controlling shareholder with 5% economic 
interest, the cost of inefficient empire-building that one minority 
shareholder should bear can be minimal since the burden is widely spread 
out among the 95% minority shareholders. 
D. Other Benefits of Empire-Building 
In addition to non-pecuniary benefits, empire-building can provide 
economic benefits and insurance to a controlling shareholder.  In this 
respect, a controlling shareholder has an incentive to rely on equity finance. 
 
 168.  Nonetheless, it does not mean that every empire-building endeavor is inefficient.  
This controversial topic, though important, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 169.  It is assumed that a controlling shareholder attains the entire non-pecuniary benefits 
irrespective of whether his economic interest in a corporation is 5% or 100%. 
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1. Economic Benefits of Empire-Building 
Empire-building is business expansion including vertical and 
horizontal integration.  It is theoretically possible that up to some point 
vertical and horizontal integration can generate efficiency through synergy 
based on the economies of scale and scope.  Another compelling defense 
for forming business groups is that they help to resolve the problems 
caused by the absence or poor functioning of institutions that corporate 
insiders in developed economies take for granted.170  For instance, given 
that there is no efficient capital market in developing countries, business 
groups can add value by having their own internal capital markets.171  
Business groups are also useful to affiliated entities since developing a 
common brand is valuable in particular in export-oriented countries.172  
Business groups which are seen as indulging in their passion for empire-
building may generate some efficiency for their shareholders, although it is 
still uncertain whether the total effect of empire-building for all of 
constituencies in a society is efficient. 
In a developing country, it is often advantageous for a corporation to 
be involved in unrelated diversification since the corporation can obtain 
economic rent from the expansion.  For example, as the size of assets 
increases, a corporation may have more opportunities to raise more debts at 
more preferential terms (e.g., cost of capital) because:  (1) a corporation 
with large assets is able to provide more securities (collateral) for the new 
debts to lenders who are less able to valuate borrowers’ ability to repay 
debts than those in a developed country; (2) as the magnitude of debt 
increases, ironically a corporation may have more negotiation leverage vis-
à-vis lenders;173 and (3) the government simply allocates scarce capital to 
only large corporations, rather than best-performing corporations, in the 
form of industrial policies. 
A large corporation has more chances to obtain licenses to new 
businesses that are profitable and protected by the government.  In addition, 
a large corporation is likely to generate excess profits via monopolistic 
power since wealth transfer takes place from trading partners and 
 
 170.  Khanna & Palepu, supra note 62, at 129; see also Khanna & Palepu, supra note 
167, at 41 (“Western companies take for granted a range of institutions that support their 
business activities, but many of these institutions are absent in other regions of the world.”). 
 171.  See Khanna & Palepu, supra note 62, at 134 (introducing an example of a business 
group’s internal capital market in Chile); see also Khanna & Rivkin, supra note 166, at 49 
(explaining that a business group can provide an internal capital market and an internal labor 
market). 
 172.   Khanna & Palepu, supra note 62, at 129. 
 173.  As a finance maxim goes, if you borrow $1000, you are only a debtor to a creditor.  
However, if you borrow $1,000,000, you might be a partner to a creditor. 
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consumers to a large corporation.  Moreover, a large corporation is at an 
advantage to attain subsidies or other preferential treatments from the 
government at the expense of general taxpayers.  As long as these windfalls 
accrue to a large “corporation” (rather than to a controlling shareholder 
individually), ultimate beneficiaries are the entire shareholders.  In this 
sense, empire-building can be “efficient” to shareholders even though 
economic rent that makes shareholders better off is indeed detrimental to a 
society.174 
This implication is of significance in two ways.  First, a controlling 
shareholder has an incentive to rely on expensive equity financing since 
equity financing builds his empire and he can gain economic rent on a pro-
rata basis.  Second, it means that minority shareholders can free-ride on a 
controlling shareholder when he collects economic rent and share the 
benefits from empire-building.  In turn, public investors may have 
incentives to be non-controlling shareholders even if there is some level of 
tunneling by a controller.175 
2. Too-Big-To-Fail:  Insurance for a Controlling Shareholder 
Another related topic in empire-building is the principle of too-large-
to-fail.  Even the United States (a champion of laissez-faire) has 
experienced a series of bailouts for large corporations when a failure of a 
large corporation was likely to affect its economy.  Notable examples 
include bailouts of Chrysler, LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management), 
and AIG (American International Group).176  In many developing countries, 
a large corporation or business group constitutes a higher percentage of the 
domestic economy than one in the United States.  Thus, there are 
compelling reasons that the government in an emerging market is more 
afraid of the collapse of a large corporation or business group.  For 
example, the dire consequence of a failure of Salim Group,177 a large 
 
 174.  The size of a slice of a pie for shareholders increases while the size of the pie for 
the entire society may shrink. 
 175.  For more reasons why minority shareholders participate in a capital market with 
insufficient investor protection, see infra Part III. 
 176.  Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath, U.S. 
to Take Over A.I.G. in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122156561931242905.  
“Just last weekend, the government essentially pulled the plug on Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc., allowing the big investment bank to go under instead of giving it financial 
support.  This time, the government decided A.I.G. truly was too big to fail.”  Id. 
177.  For a further explanation of Salim Group and its founder, see Eric Bellman, An 
Indonesian Tycoon Dies: Liem Sioe Liong, Ally of Dictator Suharto, Built Country’s Biggest 
Conglomerate, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303444204577460351515148464. 
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business group in Indonesia, would be much more devastating than that of 
the failure of Chrysler (or perhaps even a large bank) in the United States.  
Aware of the government’s fear of their possibility of failing, a large 
corporation’s controlling shareholder may conclude that empire-building 
can function as effective “insurance” for its survival. 
In this context, minority shareholders may be used as “hostages” by a 
controlling shareholder.  If a corporation has a broad base of minority 
shareholders, then a corporation and its controlling shareholder are more 
likely to be treated favorably by the government even if the government–
business relationship is initially unfriendly.  For example, when a corporate 
scandal is investigated by an honest and uncorrupt government that is not 
connected with the business, the corporation can convincingly argue that 
more investigation and punishment of the corporation and its controlling 
shareholder would affect the entire economy adversely.  The more minority 
shareholders a controlling shareholder has, the more credible this threat 
may be.  Hence, a controlling shareholder has another reason to attract 
minority shareholders by providing some protection to minorities. 
E. Stationary Controlling Shareholders 
An important question related to Gilson’s riddle is:  why would a 
controlling shareholder in a bad-law jurisdiction set the limit of 
expropriation voluntarily even though the poor legal system in the 
jurisdiction does not regulate his expropriation efficiently?178  To answer to 
this question from another aspect, I use an analytical framework borrowed 
from political economics in the context of corporate governance.179  In 
explaining the evolution of government systems, Professor Mancur Olson 
creates the terms “roving bandits” and “stationary bandits.”180  “Roving 
bandits” are bandits who depart soon and will not come to expropriate the 
same victims again.181  Thus, it is in roving bandits’ interest to take all of 
 
 178.   In a previous Subpart, this question is solved in part.  See supra note 132 and 
accompanying text. 
179.  This Subpart is explained based on Kang, supra note 27 (attempting to solve the 
puzzle that in jurisdictions with insufficient investor protection, some controlling 
shareholders voluntarily extract public shareholders less than other controlling shareholders, 
using the analytical framework of banditry).      
 180 .  As for “roving bandits” and “stationary bandits,” see MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND 
PROSPERITY:  OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIP 7 (2000); see 
generally Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 567 (1993) (exploring the social and economic incentives created by roving bandits 
who engage in total plundering under the “uncoordinated competitive theft” in anarchic 
conditions versus those created by stationary bandits, who rationalize theft in the form of 
partial and periodic taxes). 
 181 .  See Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, supra note 180, at 568. 
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their victims’ wealth at once.  In contrast to short-sighted roving bandits, 
“stationary bandits” stay with victims for a long time and continuously 
expropriate victims. 182   With an encompassing interest in victims’ 
prosperity, stationary bandits take a part of victims’ wealth in the form of 
regular tax.183  As a result, victims prefer stationary bandits to roving 
bandits although both stationary bandits and roving bandits are same in the 
sense that they are thieves.184 
Consider the analytical framework of banditry in the context of 
corporate governance.  From the perspective of conventional corporate 
governance scholarship, a controlling shareholder regime in developing 
countries is systematically inferior to a dispersed shareholder regime.185  
This view often emphasizes tunneling where a controlling shareholder can 
illicitly transfer substantially all assets from a corporation to himself if he 
wishes. 186   However, this view should be carefully interpreted in 
developing countries, since having the capacity to rely on total plundering 
does not necessarily mean using that capacity.187  Instead, it is more precise 
to explain that controlling shareholders in developing countries can be 
categorized into at least two types. 
Take into account the first type of controllers in bad-law jurisdictions.  
Suppose that a controller has a short time horizon for some reason.  Then, 
it is often in his best interest to quickly loot his controlled corporation to 
the fullest extent via a massive one-shot transaction.  As a result, he has no 
reason to expropriate minority shareholders again because they do not hold 
any wealth in a corporation which is entirely looted.  In this respect, the 
controlling shareholder is a “roving controller.”188  In contrast, a controlling 
shareholder with a long time horizon has often an encompassing interest in 
the prosperity of minority shareholders.  He stays with minority 
shareholders in a more constructive way and maintains control over a 
corporation for a long time.  This type of a controlling shareholder is 
referred to as a “stationary controller” who chooses a form of theft by 
taking only part of corporate value periodically. 189   Accordingly, a 
stationary controller can enjoy non-pecuniary benefits—unavailable for a 
 
 182 .  Id. 
 183 .  Id. at 568-570. 
 184 .  See id. at 568. 
 185.  See La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 1151 (concluding that the results of the authors’ 
empirical study “support the idea that heavily concentrated ownership results from, and 
perhaps substitutes for, weak protection of investors in a corporate governance system”). 
 186 .  See Johnson et al., supra note 12, at 22. 
 187 .  See generally Kang, supra note 27.      
188.  Id.   
189.  Id.  
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roving controller—as well as pecuniary benefits.190  
Then, examine how a self-interested controlling shareholder decides to 
be roving or stationary.  Initially, a controlling shareholder may compare 
(1) the amount gained by a one-shot tunneling with (2) the present value of 
cumulative extractions in the long run and other benefits (e.g., non-
pecuniary benefits).  When the latter is larger than the former, he would 
choose to be stationary.191  In order to understand a stationary controller’s 
expropriation policy, reviewing a rational government’s tax policy is a 
useful way.192  Tax revenue is the product of a tax rate and taxable income; 
however, a high tax rate does not necessarily generate high tax revenue, 
since it gives taxpayers less incentive to work (i.e., taxable income will 
shrink).193  The same logic applies to the relationship between an extraction 
rate and the amount of tunneling (i.e., pecuniary benefits); the amount of 
tunneling is equal to the product of an extraction rate and the extractable 
corporate value.194   Thus, a high extraction rate does not necessarily 
generate a high amount of tunneling, since that would cause non-
controlling shareholders to withdraw their investments (i.e., extractable 
corporate value will shrink).195  Therefore, a rational stationary controller 
sets the optimal extraction rate carefully (generally at a moderate level) in 
order to maximize his “tax revenue” (i.e., the amount of tunneling) in the 
long run.196 
 
 190 .  Id.   
 191 . Id.  The following explanation is based on Kang, supra note 27.  Suppose that a 
controller extracts the entire corporate assets (e.g., $100 million) immediately if he takes a 
one-shot transaction to the total detriment of minority shareholders.  After this transaction, 
the corporation will be left as a shell without any valuable assets.  In this case, he is a roving 
controller.  Alternatively, he can extract a part of corporate assets (e.g., $5 million) annually 
by means of ongoing tunneling.  By doing so, he becomes a stationary controller.  Under 
these circumstances, the controlling shareholder will choose to be stationary as long as he 
believes that he can maintain ongoing extractions for more than twenty years (if the discount 
rate is assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity).  In addition, if the utility of the non-
pecuniary benefits for a controller and his family is taken into consideration, he will find 
that looting based on a one-shot extraction is less attractive.  For example, suppose that the 
amount of looting from a one-shot transaction is $100 million and the present value of sum 
of extractions is $80 million.  As long as the utility of non-pecuniary benefits is evaluated to 
be more than $20 million, a controller will be willing to be stationary even if being a roving 
controller is financially more advantageous to him.   
 192 .  Id. 
193. See generally Arthur B. Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future, 1765 
BACKGROUNDER (2004), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/06/the-
laffer-curve-past-present-and-future. 
194.  See Kang, supra note 27. 
195.  Id. 
 196 .  For a further analysis of a rational stationary controller’s “tax policy,” see id.  The 
presence of non-pecuniary private benefits of control may alter a controller’s tax policy to 
some degree. 
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In other words, if a controlling shareholder is a repeat-player staying 
with minority shareholders, he is not ruthless and has a strong incentive to 
care for his “continuing victims.”  In this way, it is understood that a 
stationary controller sets the limit of expropriation voluntarily even if the 
poor legal system in the jurisdiction does not regulate his expropriation 
efficiently.197  If a controller expects family inheritance, by definition he is 
often a stationary controller who stays with minority shareholders for a 
long time.198  In addition, it is likely that he will continue to rely on equity 
financing with limited stealing.  Then, he (and his descendants) would end 
up with a large number of minority shareholders, which would be 
beneficial to him (and his descendants) since minority shareholders are the 
foundation for the stationary controller’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
benefits.  In this respect, the stationary controller’s account also provides a 
useful solution to Gilson’s riddle as to why a controlling shareholder needs 
minority shareholders despite expensive equity finance. 
III. WHY DO MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS PARTICIPATE IN CAPITAL 
MARKETS DESPITE POOR PROTECTION? 
Part II analyzes, from the standpoint of a controlling shareholder, why 
he has incentives to “voluntarily” accept the minimum level of minority 
protection and attract more minority shareholders to invest in his controlled 
corporation even though the cost of equity is high to a controller.  
Transactions in a capital market are not made in a single direction by only a 
seller’s decision.  Now it is fair to ask from the standpoint of minority 
shareholders, why they “voluntarily” participate as equity buyers in a 
capital market where they are expected to be expropriated by a controlling 
shareholder. 
A. Minority Shareholders under a Stationary Controller 
As mentioned previously,199 there are at least two types of controlling 
shareholders in bad-law jurisdictions:  roving controllers and stationary 
controllers.  Faced with a rational stationary controller’s benevolent 
extraction in the long run, minority shareholders are willing to invest in a 
 
 197 .  See id.  This explanation is also related to a potential solution for the flipside of 
Gilson’s riddle since controllers’ “generous stealing” may encourage public investors in a 
bad-law country to participate in a capital market.  For a further discussion of a stationary 
controller’s role in the context of the flipside of Gilson’s riddle, see infra Part III.A.     
198.  Kang, supra note 27. 
 199 .  See supra Part II.E (discussing stationary controlling shareholders).  The following 
explanation in this Subpart (Part III.A) is also based on Kang, supra note 27.  
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corporation run by a stationary controller as long as the return on the stock 
after expropriation is comparable to the return on investments in other 
opportunities. 200   However, an important problem is that prospective 
investors do not know whether the controlling shareholder that they are 
dealing with is stationary or roving.  Under this asymmetric information, 
prospective investors would hesitate to participate in a capital market even 
when a truly stationary controller issues new equities due to the fear of 
dealing with a roving bandit. Knowing this, even a sincere stationary 
controller might be discouraged from issuing new equities and having 
public minorities.201   
In this context, a controlling “family” shareholder has a comparative 
advantage.202  Since a controlling family shareholder is a repeat-player, 
prospective investors would understand that the current controlling 
shareholder is unlikely to kill the “proverbial golden goose” due to the 
hope that it will continue to lay eggs for him and his children eternally.203  
To be sure, it is impossible for investors to know the intent of a controlling 
shareholder whether he wishes to be roving or stationary.204  However, 
investors can discover whether a given corporation is a family business by 
reviewing the corporate governance structure (e.g., how shares are spread 
among family members, whether children of a founder are managers or 
directors of a corporation).205  Once investors recognize the presence of a 
controlling family shareholder, they are likely to deem the controller to be 
stationary.  Subsequently, investors would participate in the equity market 
to gain returns under a more generous stationary controller.  As a result, the 
flipside of Gilson’s riddle (why minority shareholders participate in a 
seemingly unfair capital market where they are not protected) is solved to 
some degree.  In sum, the game is likely to be beneficial to both minority 
shareholders and a family controller.206 
 
 200 .  For the more explanation for the returns of stock and other asset classes and their 
impact on the investment decision by public investors, see infra Part III.B. 
201.  For this vicious circle of interaction between public investors and a controlling 
shareholder in a bad-law jurisdiction, see Kang, supra note 27.    
202.   Id. 
 203 . Nonetheless, there are some circumstances that could make it difficult for a 
controlling family shareholder to be a stationary controller.  For a further explanation, see 
generally id. 
 204 .  Id. 
 205 .  Id.  
206.  Benefits for a stationary controller (in particular a family controller) are already 
discussed supra Part II.E.   
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B. Imperfect Alternative Investments 
Perhaps, if controlling shareholders extract investors, then prospective 
investors may avoid investing in the stock market, and may seek 
investment opportunities from alternative asset classes, such as bank 
deposits, debt securities, and real estate.  Theoretically, this phenomenon 
would be more apparent when investors’ risk-adjusted return of equity is 
lower than that of alternative investments.207  Nonetheless, there are several 
perceivable reasons why prospective minority shareholders are unable to 
totally shun investing in the stock market. 
While bank deposits are a very safe investment, they generate low 
returns.  Although the risk-adjusted return of bank deposits is higher than 
that of equity investment in some cases, investing solely in bank deposits is 
not a workable option for investors who need to meet a certain amount of 
“absolute” return.  As a result, at least some investors reallocate their 
wealth from bank deposits to stocks, which generate higher absolute 
returns.  Investment in debt securities, such as government and corporate 
bonds, has similar problems.  Therefore, there are many minority 
shareholders in developing countries despite controllers’ tunneling in 
corporations. 
In addition, in a bad-law country, if equity investment is impaired due 
to controllers’ extraction, it is likely that investment in other assets is 
scathed as well.  For example, when laws do not protect minority 
shareholders (i.e., public investors in a stock market), creditors of 
corporations (e.g., public investors in a bond market) are likely to be 
subject to a similar risk.  In that case, an alternative investment in a bond 
market would not generate higher risk-adjusted return than stocks, let alone 
higher absolute return. 
Investors often see real estate as an attractive alternative to a stock 
market as well.  However, the problem is that since the value of specific 
real estate generally accounts for a huge portion of an individual’s 
wealth,208 many investors are exposed to huge idiosyncratic risk.  Even 
worse, real estate is a very illiquid asset.  Thus, investors take the risk of 
selling real estate at a deep discount in an emergency.  For these reasons, 
investing in real estate is not fit for many ordinary investors, who are not 
sufficiently wealthy to deal with these risks.  In developed economies, 
 
 207 .  In this Article, alternative investments are meant to be investments in any asset 
other than stocks.  Thus, for example, an investment in bonds is treated as an alternative 
investment, let alone an investment in real estate. 
 208 .  Suppose that an investor’s single real estate investment (e.g., a house) accounts for 
70% of his personal wealth.  If the value of that real estate was adversely affected by some 
macroeconomic problems, it would significantly affect the investor’s total wealth. 
KANG_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/14  10:18 AM 
2014] CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER REGIME 887 
 
these problems may be well solved by the liquid and thick mortgage 
markets and indirect real estate investment tools such as Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs).  However, this has not been the case for many 
bad-law economies until the recent past. 
In sum, equity is not the only imperfect asset in a country with 
insufficient investor protection, and investing in assets other than stocks is 
not always feasible.  Therefore, investors should choose optimal 
combinations among imperfect assets including stocks, even if returns from 
investment in stocks are impaired by controllers’ expropriation.  Since an 
overarching principle of finance is diversification between classes of assets 
in order to eliminate unsystematic risks, putting equities in an investment 
pool is beneficial to investors even when alternative investments are sound 
and feasible. 
One may argue, if controllers scathe domestic stocks through 
tunneling, investors may shun domestic stocks and invest internationally.  
In addition, international investment is beneficial to investors because 
adding international assets enhances risk-adjusted return.209  In reality, 
however, many jurisdictions with poor law have established regulations on 
the outflows of their citizen’s investment.210  Even in countries without 
tight capital regulations, domestic investors would find it difficult to invest 
significantly in assets abroad for the following reasons. 
Most of all, domestic investors have insufficient information about 
potential foreign investments, so they are less confident in investments in 
foreign markets.  In addition, home bias211 reinforces the tendency of 
domestic investors to invest mainly in domestic assets, even if international 
investment can provide higher risk-adjusted return.  Moreover, it is 
noteworthy that international investment mainly supplements domestic 
investments.  Put differently, international investment is more appropriate 
for affluent people whose wealth needs additional diversification after 
investing the vast majority of their assets in a domestic market.  In contrast, 
many potential non-controlling shareholders in developing countries are 
 
 209 .  For the explanation on the international diversification, see generally Haim Levy & 
Marshall Sarnat, International Diversification, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 668 (1970). 
 210 .  For example, Korean government restricted international capital flows before the 
Asian financial crisis.  Taiwan restricted international capital flows and liberalized them in 
the end of the 1990s.  Rui Castro, Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn MacDonald, Investor 
Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1131, 1156, 1156 
n.18 (2004). 
 211 .  Home bias is the phenomenon that investors tend to invest the vast majority of 
capital in assets in domestic countries.  It is a special version of familiarity bias where 
investors tend to invest the vast majority of capital in assets that they are familiar with.  As 
for familiarity bias, see Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 
659, 659-60 (2001). 
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middle class investors who would be less able to invest their capital for 
diversification beyond domestic investments.212  Even worse, the currency 
risks posed by international investment could be another obstacle for small 
individual investors to overcome, if they do not have sources to hedge 
against these risks.213  These problems would be more severe when an 
undeveloped capital market in a developing country does not provide small 
individual investors with efficient collective investment tools, such as 
funds that specialize in and diversify foreign equities.  Consequently, 
unless controlling shareholders extract to an extreme degree, potential 
investors have an incentive to participate in a domestic capital market as 
non-controlling shareholders. 
C. Behavioral Finance Problems That Public Investors Are Subject to 
Modern standard finance theories are built on core assumptions such 
as rational investors and perfect information.214  However, the real-world 
experiences and psychological research of human behavior have shown that 
these assumptions often do not hold.215  Realizing the limitations of modern 
standard finance, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky pose a new theory 
of behavioral finance.  They argue that individuals are inclined to misjudge 
 
 212 .  Indeed, there are international diversification benefits to investors investing in 
equity markets abroad.  As is widely known, however, the requirements of international 
diversification are the willingness and ability to take the greater risks that arise from 
international investment.  Wealthy investors in developed countries are able (and willing) to 
be involved in international diversification, but many minority shareholders in developing 
countries are not. 
 213 .   It is known that the success of international investment has depended heavily on the 
performance of foreign exchange in a country wherein investors invest.  Since the volatility 
of foreign exchange has been great, the risk associated with investing in international 
investment has been large.  Thus, in principle international investment has required 
investors to have more willingness and capacity to take risks.   
 214 .  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 
Twenty Years Later:  The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 718 (2002).  Based on these 
assumptions, modern standard finance relies on three theoretical pillars:  the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (“CAPM”), the Miller-Modigliani Irrelevance Propositions, and the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (“EMH”).  Id.  As to the EMH, Professor Jensen famously states, “the 
efficient market hypothesis is the best established fact in all of the social sciences.”  Andrei 
Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 
19, 19 (1990). 
 215 .  For example, Herbert Simon describes that “human behavior is intendedly rational, 
but only boundedly so.”  HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 88 (4th ed. 1997).  
“Behavioral models of financial markets consider not only how people should act but also 
how they do act.  People do not always behave rationally, and although departures from 
rationality are sometimes random, they are often systematic.”  Brad M. Barber & Terrance 
Odean, The Courage of Misguided Conviction, 55 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 41, 41 (1999). 
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an asset’s value due to cognitive biases and heuristics. 216   Based on 
behavioral finance issues, public investors in bad-law countries are likely to 
invest in domestic equity markets as non-controlling shareholders even if 
extraction by the controller renders the shares unworthy of investment. 
Most individuals have a tendency to be overconfident—they believe 
that they are more competent, knowledgeable and proficient than they 
actually are.217  Likewise, investors in a bad-law country would like to 
purchase stocks since they are confident in their forecasting capability, 
even if those stocks are volatile and subject to serious tunneling risk.  In 
addition, names of large conglomerates appear in the national media every 
day, and the advertisements of those conglomerates repeatedly influence 
people in domestic markets.  Then, familiarity bias218 holds, and investors 
invest their wealth in shares of such conglomerates despite controlling 
shareholders’ exploitation.  Home bias,219  explained above, is another 
reason that prospective investors in bad-law countries invest in the 
domestic capital market.  Once investors purchase shares, it is likely that 
they are also subject to status quo bias even if the shares’ performance is 
disappointing due to corporate governance problems incurred by 
controllers. 
Moreover, minority shareholders often play the role of noise traders.220  
Based on fads and sentiments, investors might invest in shares issued by 
large family conglomerates even if rational information indicates that 
domestic corporations are subject to a high risk of expropriation.  When 
some noise traders earn high returns, many investors might follow those 
noise traders’ trading patterns, ignoring the fact that those successful 
traders took excessive risk and were just lucky.221  Buying shares of a 
 
 216 .  See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 214, at 724; Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) 
(describing how the usage of heuristics and biases can lead to errors in judgment); see also 
Barber & Odean supra note 215, at 41 (explaining that people often deviate from rationality 
in a systematic way). 
 217 .  “Psychological studies show that most people are overconfident about their own 
relative abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about their futures.”  Colin Camerer & Dan 
Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry:  An Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. 
REV. 306, 306 (1999). 
 218 .  As for familiarity bias, see generally Huberman, supra note 211 (explaining home 
bias and familiarity bias). 
 219 .  Familiarity bias and home bias are closely related.  “[R]ecent research suggests that 
home bias may be part of a larger phenomenon in which investors exhibit a preference for 
familiar companies.”  Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, How Distance, Language, and 
Culture Influence Stockholdings and Trades, 56 J. FIN. 1053, 1053 (2001) (citation omitted). 
 220 .  Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 214, at 724 (explaining that noise traders “make 
investment decisions that deviate from those that theory would predict of rational 
investors”). 
 221 .  Shleifer & Summers, supra note 214, at 25. 
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family-controlled corporation in a bad-law country is often analogous to 
gambling.222  Whereas almost all gamblers know that they will lose on the 
average, most potential minority shareholders in a stock market believe that 
their expected return is positive even if controllers manipulate the game 
and the risk-adjusted return is lower than it should be.  In this way, more 
prospective investors gamble in the stock market casino as non-controlling 
shareholders. 
D. Minority Shareholders Are Looted, But They Buy Shares at 
Discount 
In Subpart A through C, I explained reasons why minority 
shareholders participate in a stock market even if they are subject to serious 
expropriation risk by a controller.  In this Subpart, however, I explore the 
possibility that minority shareholders in bad-law jurisdictions actually 
might not be damaged financially.  Professor Coffee puts forward a 
counterintuitive but creative account:  the public shareholders buy their 
shares at a “bargain” price, which already reflects the likelihood that the 
controlling shareholder will expropriate wealth in the future;223 thus, “the 
public shareholders would receive an undeserved ‘windfall’ if legal rules 
were revised to entitle them to a proportionate share of corporate assets and 
distributions.”224  In other words, even if the price of minority shares is 
lower than their fundamental value due to controllers’ extraction, minority 
shareholders would not suffer since they purchase those shares at a 
depressed price for that same reason.225  Therefore, as Professor Coffee 
explains, “[f]rom an efficiency perspective, it may be clear that the 
economy will do better if the minority is protected, but from a normative 
perspective, the respective entitlements of the majority and the minority 
can be debated endlessly.”226 
I essentially agree with this insightful opinion.  However, I think that 
additional analysis of the impact of “volatility of expropriation” on public 
investors is needed for further clarification.  Suppose that there are three 
investors, “Investor A,” “Investor B,” and “Investor C.”  They buy and sell 
 
222.  See, e.g., ECONOMIST, Casino Capital:  China’s Financial Market Are Wild—and 
Often Less than Wonderful (Feb. 6, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1559717.   
 223 .  Coffee, supra note 35, at 659; see also Black, supra note 129, at 806 (using an 
example from Coffee, supra note 35, at 657-59). 
 224 .   Coffee, supra note 35, at 659.  
 225.  For example, assume that the intrinsic price of a corporation’s shares is $100.  
Suppose that the current price of shares of the corporation for minority shareholders is $70 
due to the controlling shareholder’s expropriation.  However, it does not mean that minority 
shareholders lose their wealth if their purchasing price was $70. 
 226 .  Coffee, supra note 35, at 659. 
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shares of Corporation “XYZ” controlled by a controlling shareholder.  
Initially, A holds shares (at time 1), and sells them to B (at time 2).  
Finally, B sells them to C (at time 3).  Suppose that the controlling 
shareholder partially extracts firm value at time 1 and time 2, but he 
appropriates almost all of the firm value at time 3.  A lenient level of 
extraction already has been reflected in the share price in the form of a 
discount when A and B purchased shares, thus A and B might not be 
financially damaged.  However, C would be seriously injured because the 
extraction at the time of sale is greater than at the time of purchase (i.e., 
buy high and sell low).  If the ex post degree of looting is far beyond the 
investors’ ex ante expectations, or if the controlling shareholders 
unexpectedly transfer corporate wealth through a one-time extraction, 
minority shareholders are clearly damaged, which is not explained in 
Coffee’s account.227 
In this respect, the notion of family (i.e., a repeat-player) in business 
groups is important again.  As discussed earlier, a controlling family 
shareholder with inheritance usually exploits minority shareholders as a 
stationary controller, since partial extraction is more beneficial to a 
controller with a long term horizon than total extraction in terms of joint 
utility of pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits.  In this case of 
“stable expropriation,” therefore, it is likely that C buys a share at the 
discounted price and he will sell at the similar discounted price, meaning 
that C is not financially damaged.228 
E. Foreign Minority Shareholders 
Although equities in bad-law countries are scathed by poor corporate 
governance, a large number of foreign investors invest in such securities.  
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that foreign investors are 
able to purchase shares at a relevant discounted price even if there are 
corporate governance problems.  Simply put, foreign investors are not very 
concerned about the expropriation since expropriation is already reflected 
in the purchasing price.  Sometimes, foreign investors massively buy 
cheaper shares in an emerging country after the country experiences 
financial crisis, which more deeply reinforces the discount.  In addition, 
 
 227 .  In other words, when a controlling shareholder changes his status from a stationary 
controller to a roving controller, it is possible that minority shareholders who purchase their 
shares under a stationary controller and sell their shares under a roving controller are 
financially damaged.  
 228 .  Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that family controllers are not always stationary 
although they are likely to be stationary. 
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unlike domestic minority shareholders,229 foreign investors are able to 
achieve the benefits of international diversification. 
Most of all, foreign investors are usually large institutional investors 
in developed countries.  Thus, they do not face substantial regulation of 
investment abroad.  In addition, they are capable of taking the risks of 
international investment, which would enhance diversification further.  
From the perspective of U.S. institutional investors, the correlation between 
the United States and foreign markets is so low that adding foreign 
investments to a domestic portfolio could result in lowering the risk.  
Higher returns are also expected, as many emerging markets will often 
outperform the markets in the developed countries.  Moreover, the amount 
of their investment in bad-law countries is only a small portion of their 
overall investment, so foreign investors can take the risky position of 
minority shareholders in bad-law countries.  Nonetheless, the amount of 
investment from foreign investors is significant from the perspective of 
controllers in a bad-law country due to the disparity between the sizes of 
the economies.  Thus, in the equity market of a poor-law country, foreign 
shareholders could take an important role as “minority shareholders.” 
It is unlikely that foreign minority shareholders react to bad corporate 
governance as an organized group and directly punish greedy controllers.  
However, foreign minorities can indirectly punish overreaching controlling 
shareholders.  As long as foreign shareholders purchase shares of a 
corporation at a proper discounted price, foreign shareholders are able to 
endure a partial extraction.  However, if controlling shareholders rely on 
substantially all extraction, foreign shareholders would follow the Wall 
Street Rule (i.e., they will sell their shares).  Domestic minority 
shareholders believe that foreign minority shareholders—sophisticated and 
large global financial entities—are like a litmus paper and possess better 
information about domestic stocks and are more capable of assessing 
corporate value.  Observing the movement of foreign shareholders, 
domestic minority shareholders would follow the selling trends of foreign 
shareholders.230  In this way, once a developing country has a significant 
number of foreign minorities in a stock market, it is likely that controlling 
shareholders in the jurisdiction will not be able to easily exacerbate the 
extent of tunneling.231 
 
 229 .  As explained earlier, domestic minority shareholders in a bad-law country have 
found it difficult to participate in international investment:  the circumstances in a bad-law 
country, including regulations, the relatively low level of wealth, and the underdevelopment 
of financial intermediaries like funds, impede international investment.  See supra Part III.B.   
 230 .  In other words, domestic minority shareholders in a developing country are under 
the herding effect created by foreign investors. 
 231 .  However, this does not mean that a controlling shareholder in the jurisdiction must 
improve corporate governance.  As long as the quality of corporate governance is 
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F. Minority Shareholders May Free-Ride When a Controlling 
Shareholder Expropriates Other Stakeholders 
In regard to dispersed shareholder regimes, the academic interest in 
corporate governance focuses on the relationship between managers and 
shareholders—the former exploits the latter.  On the other hand, when it 
comes to controlling shareholder regimes, the lopsided relationship 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders has been 
emphasized.  Again, the former loots the latter.  Combining these two 
views, conventional corporate governance scholarship, by and large, limits 
its analytical frameworks to what I call the “triumvirate model” (i.e., the 
corporate governance model based on managers, controlling shareholders, 
and minority shareholders).  Under this tradition, minority shareholders are 
(almost) always seen as the weakest in the “food chain,” extracted either by 
managers or controlling shareholders.  Accordingly, other stakeholders—
employees, creditors, trading partners, consumers, and taxpayers—are not 
treated in this model.  Perhaps, in the United States, the triumvirate 
framework is working relatively well.  Fiduciary duty is almost exclusively 
for shareholders since other stakeholders are seen as protected by contracts. 
In contrast, the traditional triumvirate framework is not necessarily 
suitable for a bad-law country where economic interest of other 
stakeholders (let alone that of minority shareholders) is damaged by 
corporate insiders.  Although controlling shareholders’ tunneling scathes a 
capital market, the capital market is not the only market that is imperfect.  
For example, in an imperfect labor market, employees are expropriated by 
a corporation as they receive less economic benefits in exchange for their 
labor.  As a result, some of the employees’ welfare is transferred to the 
corporation, and the entire body of all shareholders including minority 
shareholders is benefitted as well. 
In addition, in a country where minority shareholders are not protected 
well, it is likely that creditors are not protected by contracts either.  As a 
borrower, a corporation is able to take advantage of creditors by various 
means.  For example, it is widely known that a corporation may take on a 
highly risky project for shareholders at the lender’s risk.  If a project is 
successful, shareholders get the upside benefits as residual claimants; if it 
turns out dismal, the lender should bear the downside cost.  In that way, 
shareholders including minority shareholders can transfer welfare from 
creditors to themselves.  In a bank-finance economy, the magnitude of the 
 
maintained (and does not deteriorate further), foreign minority shareholders do not lose.  
Instead, they buy and sell stocks at the same discounted rate reflecting the same quality of 
corporate governance.  Under these circumstances, foreign minority shareholders do not 
have a strong incentive to punish controllers by following the Wall Street Rule. 
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wealth transfer might be huge if creditors are not properly protected. 
Furthermore, a large corporation in a bad-law country is usually able 
to wield gigantic monopoly power in each market where it plays.  It is 
highly likely that the competition law system is inefficient, when the 
quality of corporate law is low.232  Therefore, a great deal of trading 
partners’ and consumers’ welfare would be transferred to a large 
corporation where minority shareholders participate as its partial owners.  
Besides, the government in a developing country sometimes greatly 
subsidizes large corporations.  Accordingly, taxpayers’ money is 
transferred to all shareholders, including minorities. 
In sum, my point is straightforward.  True, in a country with poor 
shareholder protection, minority shareholders are generally “victims” in 
relation to the controlling shareholder who is usually suspected of being the 
“wrongdoer.”  The problem may arise when a controlling shareholder loots 
other stakeholders in a corporation.  In this case, minority shareholders may 
free-ride on a controller as “shareholders” and may benefit to the detriment 
of other stakeholders.  In this sense, minority shareholders have incentives 
to participate in stock markets where they are not properly protected vis-à-
vis controlling shareholders.  Simply put, minority shareholders in bad-law 
countries, in fact, are not situated at the bottom of the “food chain.”  
Indeed, it is not conclusive whether the minority shareholders’ benefit from 
this free-riding exceeds their cost of expropriation by a controller.  It 
depends on jurisdictions and on a case-by-case analysis.  Rather, what is 
emphasized here is that minority shareholders in a bad-law country are not 
“unilateral victims” that is depicted by the conventional triumvirate model. 
CONCLUSION 
Law and finance theories proposed by LLSV have greatly contributed 
by introducing scientific methodologies to comparatively evaluate 
corporate governance.  Nonetheless, their works have generated 
conundrums (including Gilson’s riddle and the flipside of Gilson’s riddle) 
that, so far, have not been explained well.  In response to these 
conundrums, Professor Gilson proposes the PMBA as a possible answer.  
To be sure, the PMBA is an insightful idea that changes an analytical 
framework to solve Gilson’s riddle.  Despite its huge contribution in 
pioneering this uncharted territory, however, the PMBA’s explanatory 
power could be weakened under certain circumstances, particularly in a 
corporation where a controller’s cash flow rights are minimal. 
 
 232 .  See supra note 99 (stating the high correlation between the quality of corporate law 
and competition law). 
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After a critical review of the PMBA, this Article proposes alternative 
explanations.  To this end, this Article has two approaches.  From the 
perspective of a controlling shareholder, I analyze in Part II why a 
controlling shareholder relies on equity finance and has so many public 
investors even though the cost of equity is substantially high.  In addition, 
from the perspective of public investors, I analyze in Part III the incentives 
of public investors to participate in capital markets with poor investor 
protection.  Based on these interactions in a capital market, as Marshall’s 
scissors indicate, both controlling shareholders and public investors can 
enjoy surplus.  In this sense, informal (non-legal) institutions create a 
symbiotic relationship between two parties in a bad-law country. 
Since each controlling shareholder regime has its idiosyncrasies, 
generating a (or the) “general theory” for the controlling shareholder 
system is impractical.  Perhaps, a large but missing part of the comparative 
corporate governance scholarship is an analysis based on the culture, which 
makes one system distinctive from the others.  For example, the value of 
non-pecuniary benefits is very dependent on the people’s mindset and 
preferences shaped by their particular culture.  In this context, it is worth 
noting Professor Milhaupt’s comment.  “It is obvious that an analytical 
framework exploring incentives is fundamental in understanding the 
conduct of rational economic persons like a controller and minority 
shareholders.  Nonetheless, I start to be convinced that we need to see 
through the lens of culture for a more comprehensive analysis of corporate 
governance.”233  Agreeing with this insight, I look forward to seeing future 
works that will combine economic analysis and cultural explanations for 
this largely uncharted territory of comparative corporate governance. 
 
 
 233 .  Discussion with Curtis Milhaupt, Professor, Columbia Law School, in N.Y.C., N.Y. 
